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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 42 1997 NUMBER 1
BETWEEN ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: THE RIGHT TO
TESTIFY AND IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION
ALAN D. HORNSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTIONIN Rock v. Arkansas,' the United States Supreme Court declared
for the first time what theretofore it had only suggested or as-
sumed: The defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right
to testify in his or her own behalf. For many defendants, however,
that right is illusory. If the defendant has been convicted of one or
more offenses prior to the trial at which he or she wishes to testify,
the price of exercising the right to testify may be that the jury will
be informed of those prior convictions.2 If the jury learns that a
defendant previously has been convicted of a crime, the probability
of conviction increases dramatically.3 Typically, the defendant may
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. The work for this
Article was supported by a grant from the University of Maryland School of Law. I
am grateful for the very able research assistance of Jessica Collins and Catherine
McCallie. Permission is given to reproduce this Article in whole or in part for
classroom use.
1. 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding that Arkansas's ban on hypnotically refreshed
testimony was impermissible given defendant's constitutional right to testify in her
own defense).
2. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting government to
use prior conviction evidence to impeach defendant's testimony); Luck v. United
States, 348 F.2d 763, 768-69 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that criminal defendant may
be impeached with evidence of prior convictions), superseded by statute as stated in
Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., 683 A.2d 142, 148 &
n.11 (D.C. 1996) (recognizing that Congress amended statute to require admis-
sion of prior conviction evidence offered to impeach witness); Edward E. Gainor,
Note, Character Evidence By Any Other Name... : A Proposal to Limit Impeachment by
Prior Conviction Under Rule 609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762, 769-70, 789-800 (1990)
(suggesting revision of Rule 609). For a discussion of the evolution of Federal
Rule of Evidence 609, see infra notes 24-45 and accompanying text.
3. See HARRY KALVEN & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 tbl.52 (1966)
(reporting that probability of acquittal in otherwise evenly balanced case decreases
from 65% to 38% in face ofjury's knowledge of defendant's prior convictions); see
also McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at 99 (Edward W. Cleary et al. eds., 3d ed.
1984) [hereinafter McCoRMICK] (noting that jury will pay close attention to prior
1
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keep the jury from learning of prior convictions only by waiving the
right to testify.4
It is a long-standing principle of the law of evidence that a de-
fendant's character for law breaking may not be used as evidence
that the defendant committed the particular offense for which he
or she is being tried. 5 Moreover, even if character evidence were
conviction despite contrary instructions);James E. Beaver & Steven L. Marques, A
Proposal to Modify the Rule on Criminal Conviction Impeachment, 58 TEMPLE L.Q. 585,
592-93 (1985) (noting prejudice caused by admission of prior conviction); Robert
G. Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, 1 Lov. U. CHI. L.J.
247, 249 (1970) (discussing Kalven and Zeisel's study).
4. Of course, if the defendant elects not to testify, the probability of convic-
tion also increases dramatically. Instructions to the jury that it may draw no infer-
ence from the defendant's failure to testify are widely regarded as ineffective.
Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [fl?] Analysis
and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REv. 637, 667 (1991) (arguing character im-
peachment of criminal defendants should be prohibited, yet some character im-
peachment of other witnesses should be permitted). Professor Friedman stated:
[Tlhe accused's failure to testify affirmatively raises the jurors' probability
assessment of guilt from the baseline level. No matter how vigorously the
court instructs the jurors not to take into account that failure to testify,
they are almost certain to do so. This proposition is hardly novel, but it
warrants close examination. Jurors consider the failure to testify not
merely because they might lack the sophistication to follow the judicial
instruction, or even because they are disposed to ignore the instruction
so that they can implement their own sense ofjustice. Rather .... jurors
tend to disregard the instruction because it is virtually incoherent.
Id. 677-88 (footnote omitted); see LEwis MAYEPS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFrH
AMENDMENT? 21 (1959) (stating that 71% of poll respondents inferred guilt from
defendant's refusal to testify); see also McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 43, at 99 (dis-
cussing dilemma regarding whether accused should testify); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609,
82 W. VA. L. REv. 391, 400-01 (1980) (noting "undeniable" presumption against
individual who stands mute).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character.., is not admis-
sible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion .... ); see also United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89 (7th Cir. 1975)
(stating that inference that accused is likely to commit crime again is not permit-
ted). There are exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (1)
(allowing admission of "pertinent" character evidence for purpose of proving ac-
tion in conformity with character when "offered by an accused, or by the prosecu-
tion to rebut the same"); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-82 (1948)
(ruling that where defendant puts his character in issue, prosecution may inquire
into prior arrests as well as convictions); Sparks v. Gilley Trucking Co., 992 F.2d 50,
51-53 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that under facts of case, evidence of prior speeding
tickets could not be admitted to prove negligence in automobile tort action);
United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that trial
court's failure to sever charges for bank robbery and possession of firearm after
felony conviction and admission of evidence of prior felony at trial did not unfairly
prejudice defendant); Friedman, supra note 4, at 641-42 (noting and discussing
limitation on admissibility of character evidence); Richard D. Friedman, Character
Impeachment Evidence: The Asymmetrical Interaction Between Personality and Situation,
43 DuKE LJ. 816, 821-22 (1994) (responding to Uviller's article, infra); H. Richard
2
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admissible, it could not be established by specific acts of miscon-
duct.6 These rules exist because such evidence would be unduly
prejudicial to the defendant,7 might consume too much time8 and
might confuse the issues the jury is called upon to decide. 9
Yet, if the defendant elects to testify, the conventional view
holds that prior convictions (for at least some offenses) have sub-
stantial value in determining whether the defendant is testifying
truthfully on the particular occasion.10 Indeed, this value is per-
ceived as sufficiently great to warrant the risk that despite limiting
instructions the jury will misuse the evidence of prior convictions"
Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42
DuKE L.J. 776, 831 (1993) (concluding that Federal Rules of Evidence do not pro-
vide jury with adequate "instrument" with which to assess credibility). But see Fried-
man, supra note 4, at 677 (stating that ban on admissibility of character evidence is
not too restrictive and should only be relaxed under "very narrow circumstances").
6. FED. R. EVID. 405(a). If, however, the character trait is an essential element
of the crime or defense, character may be proven with evidence of specific acts.
FED. R. EVID. 405(b); see also United States v. Waloke, 962 F.2d 824, 826, 830 (8th
Cir. 1992) (affirming decision to allow evidence of victim's reputation of violence
but not evidence of specific acts of violence to support defendant's claim of self-
defense in prosecution for assault with dangerous weapon and assault resulting in
serious bodily injury); United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337, 353 n.23 (7th Cir.
1990) (stating, in dicta, that testimony was inadmissible in narcotics case because
testimony of defendant's dentist that he never witnessed defendant buy or sell co-
caine was not essential element of charge, claim or defense).
7. Miguel A. Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality,
45 EMORY L.J. 221, 223-24 (1996); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the
Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on
Guilt, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 47 (1985); see also David P. Brydan & Roger C.
Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offenses Cases, 78 MINN. L. Riv. 529, 566-83
(1994) (discussing proposed amendments of rule prohibiting evidence of prior
misconduct in cases of sex offenses); Friedman, supra note 4, at 642-43 (suggesting
that character evidence affects jurors powerfully).
8. See Mendez, supra note 7, at 223 (noting potential complications associated
with character evidence, including consumption of time); Uviller, supra note 5, at
800 (discussing time burden).
9. FED. R. EVD. 403 ("[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by ... confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ....
undue delay, [or] waste of time .... ); see also Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The
Preudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 220, 240-43 (1976) (discussing confu-
sion of issues, misleading of jury and wasting of court time as factors in Rule 403
calculus for unfair prejudice); Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observa-
tions on the Nature of Unfairly Preudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REv. 497, 497 (1983)
(same); Mendez, supra note 7, at 223 (noting confusion ofjurors where prior bad
acts are admitted).
10. See Mendez, supra note 7, at 225 (noting that "[m]ostjurisdictions permit
parties to impeach witnesses with evidence of convictions.., and prior bad acts...
that are probative of a witness' lack of veracity"); Uviller, supra note 5, at 831 ("In-
deed, the Federal Rules may have stood common sense on its head, for the infer-
ence of disposition is more readily and reasonably drawn in the instance of
primary criminal conduct than in the instance of testimonial perjury.").
11. See Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70
YA L.J. 763, 763 (1961) (noting tendency of jury to infer guilt of defendant be-
1997]
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and will apply it to the inadmissible inference of guilt rather than
the permissible inference of prevarication.1 2
Before the Supreme Court's ruling in Rock, most challenges to
the admissibility of prior conviction evidence to impeach the crimi-
nal defendant were based upon the prejudicial effect such evidence
would have on the jury's determination of guilt or innocence. 13
More sophisticated analyses also considered the low probative value
prior conviction evidence held on the veracity of the testifying de-
fendant.1 4 To the extent that constitutional values were implicated
in such challenges, the claim was a general denial of due process
arising from this prejudice.' 5 These challenges were rarely success-
ful, however, and impeachment by prior conviction seemed to hold
a secure place in the arsenal of the prosecutorial cross-examiner. 16
The Supreme Court appeared to have approved the use of prior
cause he or she was found guilty of different offense in past) [hereinafter Balanc-
ing]; Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant
with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 215, 218 (1968) (stating that
many practicing attorneys and scholars believe jurors cannot "capably" separate
character evidence "according to its permissible uses") [hereinafter To Take the
Stand].
12. For a discussion of scholarly studies showing that jurors tend to misuse
prior misconduct evidence, see supra note 3.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 426 F.2d 1236, 1237-39 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(challenging, unsuccessfully, admissions of prior convictions for house-breaking
and larceny); United States v. McCord, 420 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating
that denial of request for immunity from impeachment by criminal record may
have adverse effect on criminal defendant); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936,
939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting concern of jury prejudice arising from introduc-
tion of evidence of any prior criminal conviction).
14. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 4, at 665 (suggesting that jury's assessment
of defendant's "ability to bring off the lie" would not be rationally affected by evi-
dence of prior convictions).
15. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 230 & n.8 (1971) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (discussing challenges to existing procedure of admitting prior con-
viction evidence as involving due process claims), vacated sub nom. Crampton v.
Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); United States v. Webster, 522 F.2d 384, 385 (8th Cir.
1975) (per curiam) (finding that accused who takes stand in own defense may be
cross-examined as to prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes without
violation of due process rights); Trimble v. United States, 369 F.2d 950, 952 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (discussing challenge to admission of prior conviction evidence as viola-
tive of due process protections); Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1963)
(same).
16. For a discussion of cases in which defendants challenged the admissibility
of prior conviction evidence on due process grounds, see supra note 15. But see
State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (Haw. 1971) (holding that evidence of prior
convictions used to impeach defendant's credibility is unreasonable burden on
defendant's rights).
[Vol. 42: p. I
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conviction evidence 17 and the lower courts more or less routinely
admitted it for impeachment.' 8
This Article addresses whether the Court's decision in Rock
changes the calculus of admissibility of prior conviction evidence to
impeach the criminal defendant who elects to exercise the now-rec-
ognized constitutional right to testify. To establish context, the Ar-
ticle first explores the question of impeachment by prior conviction
from the standpoint of the policies underlying the law of evi-
dence. 19 Part II then examines the bases for the conclusion that
prior convictions are valuable data in ascertaining the credibility of
a testifying defendant. Part II also includes a discussion of a series
of cases from the District of Columbia which exemplifies the strug-
gle between fairness to the defendant and the traditional allowance
of prior conviction evidence to impeach.20
Part III of this Article explores the development of the right to
testify culminating in Rock v. Arkansas.21 Part IV then returns to
the question of impeachment of the criminal defendant who elects
to testify in light of Rock. 22 This Part also explores the appropriate
balance between the exercise of constitutional rights and burdens
imposed on that exercise in the service of other legitimate govern-
mental interests. Before concluding in Part V, the Article suggests a
test for the admissibility of impeaching evidence against the crimi-
nal defendant.23
17. For a discussion of cases in which the Supreme Court has discussed per-
mitted uses of prior conviction evidence, see infra notes 160-77 and accompanying
text.
18. See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1070-71 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(allowing prosecution to use prior conviction evidence to impeach defendant);
United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); United States
v. Bailey, 426 F.2d 1236, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same); United States v. McCord,
420 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (same).
19. For a consideration of the policies underlying the laws of evidence as they
affect use of impeachment by prior conviction, see infra notes 24-86 and accompa-
nying text.
20. For a discussion of those District of Columbia cases that have considered
the propriety of admitting prior convictions for impeachment purposes, see infra
notes 103-58 and accompanying text.
21. 483 U.S. 44 (1987). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis in
Rock, see infra notes 208-20 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of cases leading up to Rock's analysis regarding the crimi-
nal defendant who chooses to testify on his or her own behalf, see infra notes 223-
326 and accompanying text. For an analysis of accepted modes of impeachment of
the defendant who takes the stand, see infra Part IV, Section C.
23. For the presentation of a test aimed at determining the admissibility of
impeachment evidence against the criminal defendant, see infra text following
note 330.
19971
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II. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION: EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS
A. Background
The decision whether to testify at the cost of having the jury
learn of the defendant's prior convictions or not to testify and have
the jury draw an impermissible inference of guilt from the defend-
ant's silence, presents among the most difficult choices in the crimi-
nal justice system. 24 Courts and legislatures have struggled over the
appropriate balance to be struck between admitting prior convic-
tions of testifying criminal defendants to impeach their testimony
and excluding the use of prior convictions because of their prejudi-
cial impact on the question of guilt or innocence. 25 The issue is
perhaps one of the most controversial in the law of evidence. At
one extreme, all prior felony convictions might be deemed admissi-
ble to impeach.2 6 At the other, by decision 27 or rule,2 8 prior convic-
tions may be barred as impeaching evidence against an accused
who elects to testify in his or her own behalf.
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 is an important contributor to
the ongoing discussion of impeachment by prior conviction.2 9 The
fierce debate surrounding adoption of the rule as well as its subse-
quent history evidences some of that controversy. 30 As originally
proposed, the rule would have required admission of any felony
conviction3 l or any conviction for a crime involving dishonesty or
24. See, e.g., Gainor, supra note 2, at 762 (noting defendant's dilemma be-
tween testifying and facing prior conviction impeachment evidence and remaining
silent while jurors draw impermissible inferences); Robert D. Okun, Character and
Credibility: A Praposal to Realign Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VIL. L. REv.
533, 554-55 (1992) (discussing studies showing that convictions are more likely
where defendant does not testify).
25. Cf. Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 655-56 (1997) (reversing
conviction where trial court admitted evidence of prior conviction because admis-
sion of name and nature of offense unfairly prejudiced defendant).
26. For a discussion of efforts directed at making all prior felony convictions
admissible for impeachment purposes, see infra notes 34, 40 and accompanying
text.
27. State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Haw. 1971).
28. See, e.g., MoNT. R. EVID. 609 ("For the purpose of attacking the credibility
of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime is not
admissible.").
29. The Federal Rules of Evidence is the predominant model for a substantial
majority of state evidence codes (38 states in 1996, plus the military), making it
even more important than its use in all federal trials.
30. See Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and
the Politics of Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2295, 2296 (1995) (noting that Rule 609
"was the subject of fierce debate, sparking repeated revision during its drafting and
while it was under consideration by Congress").
31. SeeH.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7084 (stating that Rule 609, as originally submitted by Supreme Court, permitted
[Vol. 42: p. 1
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false statement 32 offered to impeach any witness, including the
criminal defendant. No distinction was made between felonies gen-
erally and so-called crimenfalsi,3 3 or between the criminal defendant
and other witnesses.
The initial draft was criticized, principally because of its failure
to provide the trial court any discretion to exclude prior convic-
tions whose prejudicial impact exceeded their probative value.34
This discretion was provided in the next iteration of the rule3 5 and
applied to both categories of convictions-felonies and crimen
falsi.3 6 Between the promulgation of the two drafts, however, Con-
gress had amended the D.C. Code, disapproving Luck v. United
States37 that had recognized trial court discretion to exclude prior
impeachment by prior conviction evidence of "crimes punishable by death or im-
prisonment in excess of one year.").
32. Id.
33. Crimenfalsi crimes involve dishonesty or false statement. The debate over
which crimes constitute crimenfalsi has been a continuing controversy under Rule
609 as adopted. See McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184, 188-89 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding shoplifting not offense involving dishonesty or false statement; conceal-
ing stolen goods is such offense); see also United States v. Whitman, 665 F.2d 313,
320 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that larceny may involve dishonesty or false state-
ment when committed by fraudulent or deceitful means). Compare Medrano v.
City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1507 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that shoplifting
is not crime of dishonesty or false statement within meaning of Rule 609(a) (2)),
and Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 1976) (rejecting govern-
ment's argument that petit larceny, absent special circumstances, was crimenfalsi,
defined by court as "crimes involving, or at least relating to, communicative, often
verbal, dishonesty"), with State v. Ray, 806 P.2d 1220, 1229 (Wash. 1991) (holding
that theft is crime of dishonesty and therefore per se admissible for impeachment
purposes), and United States v. Barnes, 622 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding
that shoplifting may be probative of veracity).
34. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 515 (1989) (stating
that committee found none of initial drafts acceptable); see also Luck v. United
States, 348 F.2d 763, 767-68 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that admission of
evidence of prior grand larceny conviction to impeach defendant was not revers-
ible error under applicable rule of evidence). For a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's
holding in Luck, see infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
35. Angelucci v. Continental Radiant Glass Heating Corp., 51 F.R.D. 314, 391-
92 (E.D. Pa. 1971). In Angelucci, the court stated:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is ad-
missible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprison-
ment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punish-
ment, unless, (3) in either case, the judge determines that the probative
value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice.
Id.
36. The Advisory Committee based this iteration of the rule on the court's
holding in Luck. For a discussion of the court's ruling in Luck, see infra notes 103-
09 and accompanying text.
37. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
1997]
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conviction impeachment evidence.38 Adverse congressional reac-
tion to the revised draft39 led to a return to the original provision,
removing any discretion to exclude prior conviction impeachment
evidence. 40
As the rule worked its way through Congress, various iterations
were suggested, each providing the trial court with a different de-
gree of discretion. For example, one version would have permitted
the trial court to exclude non-crimenfalsi crimes.41 Another version
required exclusion unless the predicate conviction was crimenfali.42
Yet another proposal would have distinguished between the crimi-
nal defendant and other witnesses by permitting only the admission
of crimen falsi convictions against the accused, but allowing any
prior felony conviction against other witnesses unless the prejudi-
cial effect of the felony convictions outweighed their probative
value.43 By the time the rule was considered by the Conference
Committee, the House had adopted its Judiciary Committee's rec-
ommendation that only crimen falsi crimes were to be admissible,
and the Senate had adopted a version making all felony convictions
admissible. 44 The compromise reached by the Conference Com-
mittee and adopted by Congress mandated the admissibility of cri-
men falsi convictions, but permitted other felony convictions to be
admitted to impeach only if the probative value of any conviction
outweighed the prejudice to the defendant. Although the rule has
since been amended, no substantive changes have been made with
respect to the admissibility of prior convictions to impeach a crimi-
nal defendant who elects to testify on his or her own behalf.45
38. For a discussion of how Congress's amendment of the D.C. Code modi-
fied the analysis of the D.C. Circuit in Luck, see infra notes 105-09 and accompany-
ing text.
39. See, e.g., Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 29 (1973) (testimony
of Professor Cleary) ("[W] e got rather an adverse reaction to the refusal to recog-
nize something along the line of the Luck [doctrine].").
40. See FED. R. EvID. 609(a) (providing strict guidelines for use of prior con-
viction impeachment evidence).
41. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 14-15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 7051,
7060-61.
42. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 7051,
7085.
43. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 14-15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 7051,
7060-61.
44. For a discussion of the House and Senate's recommendations, see supra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
45. In 1990, Congress amended Rule 609, making two changes. FED. R. Evil.
609. First, Congress abolished the limitation specifying that prior conviction evi-
dence could be elicited only on cross-examination. Amendments to Federal Rules of
Evidence-Rule 609, 129 F.R.D. 347, 353 (1990). Second, Congress amended the
[Vol. 42: p. I
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B. Prejudice and Probative Value
Most challenges to the admissibility of prior convictions to im-
peach the criminal defendant focus on the prejudice side of the
probativity/prejudice balance. As we have seen, a testifying defend-
ant with prior convictions runs the risk that a jury will misuse the
convictions in determining not just the credibility of the defendant
qua witness, but also his or her guilt.46 The defendant having previ-
ously sinned, a jury may well conclude either that the defendant is
more likely to have sinned on this occasion or that the defendant
should be removed from society regardless of her guilt of the in-
stant offense. 47 So great can this prejudicial impact be that
"[i]mproper admission of evidence of a prior crime or conviction,
even in the face of other evidence amply supporting the verdict,
constitutes plain error impinging upon the fundamental fairness of
the trial itself."48
But it is also the case that prior convictions admitted to im-
peach present serious problems on the probativity side of the bal-
ance. Typically, assessments of the probative value of prior
convictions to impeach credibility address the strength or weakness
of the inference from the prior conviction to the veracity of the
defendant/witness on the occasion of his or her testimony. Hence,
the more the prior conviction implicates veracity-related conduct,
the more likely it is to be admitted on the question of credibility.
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and most of the analogous provisions
rule to clarify that courts only have discretion regarding the admission of prior
conviction evidence when determining whether to admit evidence of prior felonies
of defendants only in criminal trials. Id. at 353-54.
46. See also Gainor, supra note 2, at 791 (noting tendency ofjurors to misuse
prior conviction evidence); Balancing, supra note 11, at 762 (same); Note, Proce-
dural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 426, 440 (1964) (same); To Take the Stand, supra note 11, at 218 (stating
that many scholars and practitioners believe that jury cannot capably separate evi-
dence); Comment, Use of Bad Character and Prior Convictions to Impeach a Defendant
Witness, 34 FORDHAM L. REv. 107, 109 (1965) (stating that prior conviction testi-
mony serves only to hurt defendant). For a discussion of studies that reveal the
impact impeachment by prior convictions has on jury determinations of a testify-
ing defendant's guilt, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 650 (1997) ("Such
improper grounds [for conviction] include ... generalizing a defendant's earlier
bad act into bad character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the other
bad act now charged (or, worse, as calling for preventive conviction even if he
should happen to be innocent momentarily)."); Mendez, supra note 7, at 223-24
(noting that jury may overestimate value of character evidence).
48. United States v. Parker, 604 F.2d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir. 1979) (citing
United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Burk-
hart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972)).
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of the state evidence codes modeled on the Federal Rules reflect
this analysis of probative value.
But such an assessment of probative value leaves out too
much. 49 It is not simply that one infers from a prior conviction that
the witness is more likely to be prevaricating on this occasion than
would be the case without the prior conviction. The inferential
chain is longer, aid it is worth examining each of the links in that
chain if we are to assess more accurately the value of the prior con-
viction as evidence of credibility. It is not that one has been con-
victed of an offense that supports the inference that the witness is
unworthy of belief; rather it is that the witness in fact committed
the offense for which he or she was convicted.50 The conviction is a
surrogate for the underlying conduct and serves to increase the
probability (because of the standard of proof necessary to sustain a
conviction) that the witness in fact engaged in that conduct.51
Thus, we infer backwards from the conviction to the conduct un-
derlying it.52 Yet, there is a real question about whether the reason-
able doubt standard serves to assure the integrity of the underlying
convictions that may be used to impeach when a very substantial
majority of all criminal convictions are not the result of trial deter-
minations, but of plea bargains. 53
Consider: A crime has been committed. Zoltan is arrested for
it. Assume, as is often the case, that Zoltan is poor, African-Ameri-
49. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 646-47 ("Researchers differ as to how dispa-
rate the situations may be before the correlation between a person's behavior in
one situation and in another diminishes to insignificance.").
50. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic,
and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845, 848 (1982) (stating that law on
character evidence is "uncertain, inconsistent and ill-defined").
51. See United States v. Werbrouck, 589 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1978) (prior
convictions used to impeach are based on "a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt in a forum which abides by specific rules... designed to protect the defend-
ant"); Friedman, supra note 4, at 644 ("[A] criminal conviction represents a deter-
mination by the judicial system, after its most painstaking type of proceeding, that
a given fact-the defendant's guilt of a crime-is true.").
52. See Uviller, supra note 5, at 805-06 (exploring interaction between Federal
Rule of Evidence 609 regulating admission of prior convictions, and Federal Rule
of Evidence 608 regulating inquiry into prior conduct whether or not evidenced by
conviction).
53. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 462-63 tbl.5.28 (Kathleen Maguire &
Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994) (stating that in 1994, 75% of criminal defendants en-
tered plea of guilty in federal district courts); see also Robert E. Scott & William S.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE LJ. 1909, 1909 n.1 (1992) (stating that
in 1989, 86% of all federal criminal cases were disposed of without trial); Tung Yin,
Comment, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement in
Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 83 CAL. L. REv. 419, 419-20, n.1 (1995) (not-
ing that in 1990, 90% of all federal criminal cases were disposed of without trial).
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can and from the inner city. 5 4 Assume as well that Zoltan has not
been in trouble with the law before. Zoltan's case is likely to be
assigned to a public defender. The public defender will have an
enormous backlog of cases and little time or resources. The case
for the Government will be assigned to an equally overworked and
understaffed assistant district attorney. Unless the crime is quite
serious or carries a mandatory minimum sentence, the prospect of
ajail sentence for Zoltan is slim. The jails are already overcrowded,
and first offenders are not routinely incarcerated. 55 Under such
circumstances, the overwhelmingly likely scenario is a plea bargain.
Zoltan may not understand the consequences of a conviction; he is
likely to be most concerned about not going to jail. So, if Zoltan is
told that he need only "confess" and he can go home, that is pre-
cisely what he is likely to do. If the jails are badly overcrowded, as
they often are in major metropolitan areas, the same scenario may
be repeated, and this time Zoltan is more likely to be arrested and
charged as he already has one conviction. 56
When Zoltan is arrested and charged the third time, he is more
likely to face imprisonment. At that point, Zoltan may wish to
plead "not guilty" and go to trial. If he does so, he will have two
choices: (1) He may elect to testify and deny his guilt, in which case
his prior convictions may be used to impeach and he will likely be
convicted;57 or (2) He may elect to forego his right to testify in
order to prevent his prior convictions from coming before the jury,
in which case he is likely to be convicted. 58 (If this scenario has any
ring of truth, it ought to lead us to question the validity of such
54. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Reforms and Racial Disparities, 78 JUDICATURE
118, 118-19 (1994) (citing arrest rates of African-Americans for violent crimes).
55. See generally Roland Acevedo, Note, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical
Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 987,
989 (1995) (stating 1992 plea bargaining ban created fear of prison overcrowd-
ing); Martin Fox, Problems Seen with Johnson's End to Plea Bargains, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25,
1992, at 1 (declaring Bronx lacked sufficient court resources to try large number
of additional cases).
56. See Carl McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions,
1970 LAw & Soc. ORD. 1, 12 (discussing problems in criminal justice system in
major metropolitan cities such as prison overcrowding and prevalence of repeat
offenders within system); see also Friedman, supra note 4, at 672 n.85 ("It is ...
conceivable that a conviction-hungry prosecutor would tend more readily to bring
a weak case against a person with a prior record ... .
57. For a discussion of studies that have shown the correlation between prior
conviction impeachment evidence used against a testifying criminal defendant and
the conviction of that defendant, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
58. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 160 tbl.52 (illustrating increased
probability that defendant will be convicted if jury becomes aware of prior
convictions).
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statistical studies as recidivism rates.) Now, Zoltan may have been
guilty of each of the offenses with which he was charged; he may
deserve to be incarcerated for a long time. But he may not, and
under the circumstances described, we cannot know.
It would be unrealistic to expect the legal system to question
the integrity of convictions based on plea bargains, especially in the
context of their use merely as impeaching evidence.59 Nonetheless,
we ought not close our eyes to the reality of the process, which pro-
vides further support for the proposition that the use of prior con-
victions to impeach criminal defendants/witnesses is of
questionable probative value. In Gordon v. United States,60 then-Cir-
cuit Judge Burger noted: "The relevance of prior convictions to
credibility may well be different as between a case where the convic-
tion of the accused was by admission of guilt by a plea and on the
other hand a case where the accused affirmatively contested the
charge. "61
For the sake of continuing the analysis, however, let us put
these doubts aside for the moment. Having satisfied ourselves that
the witness once engaged in dishonest conduct, we must then infer
that such conduct evidences a trait of character that makes it more
probable that the witness would be less than candid on other occa-
sions-specifically, the witness's current testimony. For without this
inference of character, there is nothing to connect the prior in-
stance of dishonesty with the present occasion. 62 Consequently, the
probative value of the prior conviction can be no stronger than the
inference that the single act or, at best, the small number of acts
evidenced by the conviction (s) are reliable indicators of a particular
character trait of mendacity. The validity of such an inference from
one or a few acts to the character of a person is surely not obvious. 63
59. But cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) ("It does not follow
from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's
case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the
evidence satisfies legal standards." (emphasis added)).
60. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
61. Id. at 940 n.8; cf. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972) (holding that
uncounseled convictions are inadmissible to impeach).
62. Mendez, supra note 7, at 225-26 ("In the absence of a stable personality,
character evidence is devoid of a valid predictive base and cannot be probative of
an individual's conduct across diverse situations.").
63. See Brydan & Park, supra note 7, at 561-62 nn.147-51 (stating that there is
relatively no probative value of any inference from prior conduct to current con-
duct at issue during trial); Friedman, supra note 4, at 652-54 (same); Richard B.
Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IowA
L. REv. 777, 777 (1981) ("[T]he probative value of the inference from conduct on
other occasions to conduct on the occasion in question may be relatively weak.");
Uviller, supra note 5, at 792 ("Neither truthtelling nor lying can be called a perva-
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Indeed, without consideration of the particular circumstances sur-
rounding the earlier conduct, it is reasonable to entertain substan-
tial doubts about the inference sought to be drawn.6 4 And, if the
prior conviction is the result of a guilty plea, as is typically the case,
its probative value on the defendant/witness's credibility is even
more strained. The prior guilty plea is some evidence that the de-
fendant was truthful about her legal misadventure and, hence,
ought to be more worthy of belief rather than less. Of course, the
plea bargaining process suggests that either inference is
problematic.
Nevertheless, if we are prepared to draw this inference of char-
acter from prior conduct, we must still infer from this character
trait that the witness is more likely to prevaricate in his or her cur-
rent testimony.65 Whether character has so consistent an effect on
behavior is a matter far from clear.66 Yet, the probative value of
prior conviction evidence can be no stronger than the inference
from character to conduct. This, of course, is precisely the infer-
ence the law of evidence forbids when the question is whether the
defendant committed the charged offense.67
Thus, there are several inferences we must draw for the evi-
dence of prior conviction to be probative of credibility of the wit-
ness's present testimony: (1) that the defendant in fact committed
the acts that were the subject matter of the conviction; (2) that
those acts are a valid indicator of the defendant's character for
mendacity; and (3) that the defendant is acting in conformity with
that supposed trait of character in the instance of his or her current
sive trait like a quick temper or a pessimistic outlook."); cf. FED. R. Evi. 405(a)
(barring use of specific acts to prove character except as permitted on cross-exami-
nation); Mendez, supra note 7, at 227-28 (noting inadequate predictive value of
personality traits and stating that behavior is actually shaped by specific situations).
64. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 654 (" [A] person so characterized will not
necessarily lie more readily than other people, and a person not so characterized
will not necessarily lie less than others. There are, presumably, honest muggers
and gentle perjurers.").
65. Uviller, supra note 5, at 813. Uviller stated:
Testifying as a witness is such rare behavior, the trial such a unique occa-
sion, that the honesty or dishonesty of the witness's testimony cannot be
said to be consistent with a pattern of predictable behavior. Simply put, it
is extremely unlikely that any person testifies dishonestly because of a
trait of dishonesty ....
Id.
66. See Gold, supra note 30, at 2312 nn.81-83 (citing several studies indicating
that personality does not have such consistent effect on behavior); Mendez, supra
note 7, at 228 (stating that assumption behind trait personality construct appears
to be false).
67. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (disallowing, generally, introduction of character
evidence for purpose of proving action in conformity therewith).
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testimony. The probativity of the evidence of the prior conviction
can be no stronger than the weakest link in that inferential chain.
Indeed, the probative value of the evidence of prior conviction is
the product of the probabilities of each inference necessary to sup-
port the conclusion, and that product is perforce lower than the
lowest probability of each of the several inferences to be drawn.68
With respect to character evidence on the question of guilt,
rather than credibility, we recognize these problems, as well as the
problem of prejudice to the defendant that is all but certain to arise
from the jury's awareness that the defendant has previously been
convicted of one or more crimes. Hence, the government is not
permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant has two prior
convictions for bank robbery, and therefore is more likely to have
committed the bank robbery for which she is now being tried.69
Yet, courts are often prepared to admit evidence of a prior convic-
tion for some crime involving false statement on the question
whether the defendant is testifying falsely on this occasion. There is
no reason to suppose that prior false statement convictions are any
more probative of current veracity than are prior bank robberies of
a current bank robbery.
Even more problematic are prior convictions for offenses more
attenuated from the question of veracity. However probative a
prior perjury conviction might be on the question whether the de-
fendant/witness is testifying truthfully on this occasion, a prior con-
viction for burglary,70 drug offenses7 1 or other crimes bearing less
68. See generally Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1021
(1977) (showing utility of mathematical models to serve as heuristic devices in
weighing evidence).
69. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (stating that evidence of prior convictions and
bad acts may not be admitted to prove action in conformity therewith, but may be
introduced for other purposes, such as to establish proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan and knowledge).
70. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989)
(finding no error in admission of prior felony conviction); United States v. Jacobs,
44 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (3d Cir.) (finding independent basis for admitting prior
burglary conviction), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1835 (1995); United States v. Key, 717
F.2d 1206, 1209 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that trial court did not commit abuse of
discretion in admitting prior burglary, forgery and escape convictions); United
States v. Rosales, 680 F.2d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding no abuse of discre-
tion in admitting prior burglary and forgery convictions of witness); United States
v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1323 (9th Cir. 1980) (remanding case for failure of trial
judge to make findings required by Rule 609(b)). For a discussion of Rule 609, see
supra notes 24-45 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Rein, 848 F.2d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 1988) (ruling
that admission of prior drug conviction was not abuse of discretion); Linskey v.
Hecker, 753 F.2d 199, 202 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that admission of prior larceny,
burglary and robbery convictions did not constitute abuse of discretion of trial
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directly on veracity72 perforce are even less probative of the truth of
the current testimony. Indeed, prior convictions may add less pro-
bative value on the question of credibility than on the question of
guilt or innocence. For with respect to the credibility question,
there is already substantial doubt about the defendant's veracity
arising from his or her interest in the outcome.
In balancing probativity against prejudice (and the other rele-
vant counterfactors), it is important to distinguish two different pos-
sible weights: The first we might call "absolute probative value" and
the second, "marginal probative value."73 The absolute probative
value of a piece of evidence is the extent to which that item of evi-
dence would increase the probability of the proposition for which it
is offered if there were no other evidence for that proposition. The
analysis of probative value just completed was addressed to the ab-
solute probative value of prior convictions on the question of credi-
bility. Marginal probative value, on the other hand, is the extent to
which that item of evidence would increase the probability of the
proposition for which it is offered beyond whatever other evidence
there is to support that proposition.74 Thus, the absolute probative
judge); Murr v. Stinson, 752 F.2d 233, 234 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that admission
of prior drug conviction was not abuse of discretion); United States v. Pedroza, 750
F.2d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 1984) (ruling that admission of prior drug conviction was
not abuse of discretion).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Nururdin, 8 F.3d 1187, 1191 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that defendant in handgun violation case was rightly impeached with
four prior convictions for robbery, attempted robbery and aggravated battery);
United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 580 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that defendant
was properly impeached with prior conviction for assault with deadly weapon);
United States v. Booker, 706 F.2d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding prior convic-
tion for possession of firearm by convicted felon was impeachable offense); United
States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1092 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that defendant
could be impeached with prior conviction for premeditated murder); United
States v. Bryan, 591 F.2d 1161, 1163 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding defendant was prop-
erly impeached with prior conviction for escape).
73. Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 651 (1997). In Old Chief, the
Court noted:
An item of evidence might be viewed as an island, with estimates of its
own probative value and unfairly prejudicial risk the sole reference points
in deciding whether the danger substantially outweighs the value and
whether the evidence ought to be excluded. Or the question of admissi-
bility might be seen as inviting further comparisons to take account of the
full evidentiary context of the case as the court understands it when the
ruling must be made.
Id.
74. McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 265, at 782; 22 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & KEN-
NETH W. GRAHtA", JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 546-47 (1978); see also Old
Chief 117 S. Ct. at 652 (concluding that Advisory Committee Notes on Federal
Rule of Evidence 404 "leave no question that when Rule 403 confers discretion by
providing that evidence 'may' be excluded, the discretionary judgment may be
informed not only by assessing an evidentiary item's twin tendencies, but by plac-
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value of a particular piece of evidence in a particular case never
changes, though its marginal probative value may decrease as other
evidence for the same proposition is admitted. Of course, marginal
probative value may never exceed absolute probative value and will
often be lower.
An example may help to illustrate these notions. Assume the
defendant in an assault case offers the testimony of a witness to the
effect that the defendant has a pacific character. Assume further
that there is only the one character witness. The testimony of that
witness will have a particular probative value on the pacific quality
of the defendant (though we may not be able to say with any preci-
sion exactly what that value is, nor will all persons-or all jurors-
agree on that value). Now, assume another witness of precisely
equal credibility to the first witness offers precisely the same testi-
mony. Plainly, the probative value of the testimony of the two wit-
nesses taken together does not possess twice the probative value of
either alone. As we add more and more substantially equally credi-
ble character witnesses, the marginal probative value of each wit-
ness on the question of the defendant's pacific character is
diminished, though the absolute probative value of each witness's
testimony, taken alone, remains constant. Twenty character wit-
nesses of equal credibility are not twenty times more probative than
one or ten times more probative than two.
The commonly accepted notion of "cumulative evidence" is a
recognition ofjust this point about marginal probative value. It rec-
ognizes that in evidence, as in life, there reaches a point of dimin-
ishing returns in which additional evidence does not yield a
corresponding increase in probative force.
Typically, when we speak of cumulative evidence, we have in
mind the sort of instance just described, in which the same kind of
evidence is offered to prove a particular point-for example, multi-
ple character witnesses offering essentially the same testimony. But
evidence may suffer the same disadvantages of this pure sort of cu-
mulativeness even if the evidence is not of precisely the same sort,
so long as it is offered for the same proposition. In the example of
a defendant's use of character evidence, it should make no differ-
ence to the analysis that some of the evidence offered is in the form
of reputation while some is in the form of opinion, so long as both
go to the question of character.
ing the result of that assessment alongside similar assessments of evidentiary
alternatives").
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A similar analysis is appropriate when, for example, interest in
the outcome and reputation are offered on the question of credibil-
ity-or when impeachment by prior conviction is offered in the
face of the defendant's interest in the outcome. It is important to
note that I am not suggesting that such evidence has no probative
force, simply that it has considerably less marginal probative force
given other strong evidence on the same point.
When the criminal defendant elects to testify, the prosecution
may seek to offer evidence of the defendant's prior convictions in
order to impeach that testimony, to cast doubt on the defendant/
witness's veracity, to show that the defendant is unworthy of belief.
It is critical to bear in mind that this evidence of prior conviction is
not offered on the question of the defendant's guilt-for that is
prohibited by the rules against using character to prove conduct 75
and the rules preventing the use of prior specific acts to prove char-
acter,76 but only on credibility. Let us assume, despite the demon-
strable weaknesses of the connecting inferences, that the absolute
probative value of this evidence on the question of credibility is rea-
sonably high. That is, in the absence of another reason to doubt
the credibility of a particular person, knowledge that the person
had been convicted of a qualifying crime would lower our assess-
ment of that person's credibility, despite the several inferences nec-
essary to support that conclusion.
The relevant concern, however, is not absolute probative value,
but marginal probative value. If we know, as we do in the case of
the testifying defendant, that the witness has a substantial interest
in the outcome of the matter on which he or she is testifying, our
assessment of the credibility of that testimony will be substantially
diminished.77 Indeed, at common law, criminal defendants-and
75. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). For a discussion of cases that have addressed the
rules regarding admission of prior conviction evidence, see supra note 5 and ac-
companying text.
76. FED. R. EvID. 405.
77. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 659 (stating that rational jury will typically
conclude that accused "has a strong interest in lying"). The testimony of the de-
fendant in a criminal case is uniquely subject to doubt because the defendant's
specific interest in the outcome is unlike that of any other witness in any other
case. Id. The criminal defendant's unique position is recognized in the Federal
Rule of Evidence 609(a) (1), but that recognition is limited largely to the prejudi-
cial impact that evidence of prior convictions are likely to possess. It is also true,
however, that prior conviction evidence has less marginal probative value on the
credibility of the criminal defendant because of that party's uniquely strong inter-
est in the outcome. See Beaver & Marques, supra note 3, at 614-15 (stating that jury
has adequate reason to doubt defendant's self-interested testimony, even without
evidence of prior conviction); Gainor, supra note 2, at 783-85 (discussing jury's
natural distrust of criminal defendant and his self-interested testimony); Gold,
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even parties to civil actions-were barred from testifying for this
very reason: Their interest in the outcome cast so large a doubt on
the credibility of their testimony that they were deemed incompe-
tent.78 The question we must ask about the probative value of prior
convictions, then, is how much such evidence adds to our assess-
ment of credibility in light of the defendant/witness's strong inter-
est in the outcome. 79 However much that might be, it is necessarily
less than the evidence of prior convictions standing alone.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone further in determining
the context in which the probative value of a particular piece of
evidence is to be assessed. Old Chief v. United States 0 was a prosecu-
tion for possession of a firearm by a defendant with a prior felony
conviction. The defendant had sought to prevent the Government
from introducing evidence of the nature of the prior felony by of-
fering to stipulate to the existence of the prior felony conviction
element of the offense. In deciding that the Government was not
entitled to introduce the particulars of prior conviction evidence
under the circumstances, the Court noted that the balance between
probative value and the risk of unfair prejudice was to be struck not
merely in light of other evidence of the same proposition actually
supra note 30, at 2326 (discussing juror belief that defendant is interested witness
who, if guilty, would not hesitate to commit perjury).
78. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989) ("At
common law a person who had been convicted of a felony was not competent to
testify as a witness."); see also McCORMICK, supra note 3, § 43, at 99 (discussing fact
that criminal defendant could not testify in own defense at common law because
of belief that defendant's motive to lie was so strong); Mason Ladd, Credibility Tests:
Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 174-76 (1940) (same); Robert G. Spector,
Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 334, 335 (1979) (same).
79. See generally Gainor, supra note 2, at 799. Gainor notes:
[A]n accused who testifies in his own defense faces a great disadvantage
in the credibility contest between himself and his accuser. "[W]hen a
criminal defendant testifies jurors are quite aware that he has a unique
concern with the outcome of the trial and is more likely to have
fabricated his testimony than any other witness. His testimony is there-
fore likely to be given diminished weight irrespective of impeachment."
Id. (quoting People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 520 (Mich. 1988)). By contrast,
although the absolute probative value of prior conviction evidence to impeach may
be the same for witnesses other than the criminal defendant, everything else being
equal, the marginal probative value should be higher. Thus, there is greaterjustifi-
cation for permitting prior conviction impeachment of defense witnesses other
than the defendant as well as of prosecution witnesses than impeachment of the
defendant herself. But cf. id. at 785 (arguing that prohibiting prior conviction im-
peachment of criminal defendant while permitting it for prosecution's witnesses
would "greatly increase the imbalance," disadvantaging prosecutors who must rely
on testimony of convicted criminals).
80. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
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introduced in the case, but other evidence of that proposition that
might have been introduced.8'
Finally, although the defendant/witness's interest in the out-
come may be the most important factor in assessing the credibility
of his or her testimony,8 2 it is worth noting that other avenues of
impeachment are open to the prosecution as well. Thus, even if
impeachment by prior conviction is not permitted, impeachment
by prior inconsistent statement, for example, will remain avail-
able.8 3 To the extent that other modes of impeachment are em-
ployed, the marginal probative value of prior convictions decreases
even further. Thus, the marginal probative value of evidence of
prior convictions on the question of the defendant/witness's credi-
bility is not terribly high; it adds comparatively little to our assess-
ment of whether the witness is telling the truth.
But our assessment of probative value is not yet complete. For
in addition to adding little on the question of credibility, the effect
of permitting impeachment by prior conviction of the criminal de-
fendant qua witness is often to keep the defendant off the stand
entirely. If the only way to avoid the prejudicial impact of evidence
of prior convictions is by not testifying, many defendants will
choose to "waive" the right to testify.8 4 In such cases, whatever evi-
dence the defendant has to offer will not be heard. The factfinder
will be denied the opportunity to hear from a witness who may have
the best access to the facts embraced by the charge. "When con-
fronted with the fact that his testimony would enable the prosecu-
tion to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence of his criminal
81. See id. at 651 (explaining that in proper Rule 403 balancing analysis, judge
should "evaluate the degrees of probative value and unfair prejudice not only for
the item in question but for any actually available substitutes as well").
82. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 659 (" [A] criminal defendant, whatever his
character or prior record, has a very strong interest in avoiding conviction."). Un-
like Professor Friedman, I believe that this proposition is independent of any as-
sumption the jury might make about the defendant's guilt. Indeed, this seems to
put the cart before the horse. "For virtually all-novice and experienced crimi-
nal-acquittal is the overriding, intensely desired, goal .... Uviller, supra note 5,
at 813.
83. United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding
that rule barring extrinsic evidence of misconduct to impeach is inapplicable to
evidence that contradicts witness's testimony as to material fact).
84. See also Friedman, supra note 4, at 666 ("Some defendants who would
otherwise take the stand do not do so because they do not want to face character
impeachment evidence."). For an analysis of the concerns that arise where a crimi-
nal defendant chooses to waive his or her right to testify due to a fear of being
confronted by evidence of prior convictions, see infra notes 85-86 and accompany-
ing text.
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past, a defendant frequently remains silent, even though his testi-
mony may be highly relevant to the issue of guilt or innocence."8 5
Thus, there are two aspects to the effect on the probativity side
of the scale of a rule permitting impeachment by prior conviction.
First, little of probative value is added to the determination of the
credibility of the witness being impeached beyond whatever assess-
ment has been made on the basis of the witness's interest in the
outcome of the case. Second, important evidence will be sacrificed
by the refusal of the witness to submit to such impeachment.8 6
C. The Authorities
Despite this demonstrable cost a defendant must bear if assert-
ing his or her right to testify, the clear weight of judicial authority
supports the admissibility of prior convictions to impeach the testi-
fying defendant.8 7 Most of these decisions, however, rely on
Supreme Court authority admitting a defendant's prior convictions
for purposes other than impeachment, and thus do not implicate
the defendant's right to testify. In other cases, the admissibility of
prior convictions did not depend on the defendant's exercise of an
established constitutional right because those cases in which the
particular court assumed the propriety of using prior convictions to
impeach a testifying criminal defendant predate the Supreme
Court's declaration of the constitutional right to testify in one's
own behalf.88 Yet these cases continue to be relied upon for the
idea that if a criminal defendant elects to exercise the right to tes-
tify, otherwise inadmissible prior convictions may be introduced os-
tensibly to impeach credibility.
At early common law, persons who had been convicted of com-
mitting a crime were disqualified from testifying. The disqualifica-
tion, however, had a limited effect as most felons were hanged.89
85. United States v. Hairston, 495 F.2d 1046, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1974); seeUnited
States v. McCord, 420 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("[A]s a practical matter an
adverse ruling [on a motion to exclude prior convictions to impeach the defend-
ant] may effectively foreclose a defendant from taking the witness stand ....").
86. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 825 (suggesting that threat of charac-
ter impeachment evidence deprives truth-determining process of valuable
information).
87. For a discussion of cases holding that evidence of prior convictions is ad-
missible to impeach a testifying defendant, see infra notes 103-77 and accompany-
ing text.
88. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Rock, in which the
Court ruled that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to testify in their
own behalf, see infra notes 208-20 and accompanying text.
89. 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HIsToRy OF THE COMMON LAW 191 (3d ed.
1923).
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Although the original basis of the rule-having its roots in Roman
and Germanic law9 0-is shrouded in the past, by the seventeenth
century the rule was firmly established. It was justified on a theory
of moral turpitude. Simply put, the convicted felon's testimony was
to be excluded because "from such a moral nature it [was] useless
to expect the truth."91
Jeremy Bentham was a principal opponent of the rule of dis-
qualification of felons, as he was of other testimonial disqualifica-
tions.92 Bentham noted that. the disqualification rested on the
inference of perjury to be drawn from the character of the prof-
fered witness as evidenced by that person's prior conduct.93 More-
over, Bentham emphasized that it was not the felon who suffered
the punishment of testimonial incompetence, but those in need of
the testimony.94
Perhaps as a result of Bentham's influence, the rule of incom-
petence of convicted felons gradually eroded. By 1918, the
Supreme Court, finding the testimony of a convicted forger compe-
tent, noted:
[T]he disposition of courts and of legislative bodies to re-
move disabilities from witnesses has continued ... under
dominance of the conviction of our time that the truth is
more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all
persons.. . who may seem to have knowledge of the facts
involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such
testimony to be determined by the jury.95
90. Id.
91. 2 WiGmoRE ON EVIDENCE § 519, at 609 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1979) [here-
inafter WiGMORE].
92. Id. at 610-11 (citing 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE
406 (Bowring's ed. 1827)). Bentham wrote:
In such a state of things.., the legislator has this option, and no other:
to open the door to all witnesses or to give license to all crimes. For all
purposes, he must take men as he finds them: and, for the purpose of
testimony, he must take such men as happen to have been in the way to
see, or to say they have been in the way to see, what, had it depended
upon the action, would have been seen by nobody.
7 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 406 (Bowring's ed. 1827).
93. BENTHAM, supra note 92, at 406 ("[The witness] has violated the obliga-
tions of morality in some sorts of ways; therefore it is more or less probable that he
will, upon occasion, violate them in this sort of way.").
94. Id.
95. Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).
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Some states continued to apply a rule of incompetency, at least with
respect to certain felonies-typically perjury and the like.96 Gener-
ally, however, the disqualification of convicted felons was abolished
in most jurisdictions.
Typically, when a jurisdiction abolished the disqualification of
witnesses who had been convicted of a crime, it permitted the con-
viction to be used to impeach the testimony of the witness.97 No
distinction was made between the garden variety witness and the
criminal defendant testifying in her own behalf, despite what now
seems the obviously greater prejudicial impact on the latter. Inter-
estingly, the original draft of the American Law Institute's proposed
Model Code of Evidence would have prohibited impeachment by prior
conviction of the criminal defendant/witness unless the defendant
introduced evidence to bolster his or her credibility. 98 Even then,
prior conviction evidence was limited to crimes involving dishon-
esty or false statement.99 Even more interesting, the avowed ration-
ale for the proposed rule was "the policy of encouraging the
accused in criminal cases to take the stand."100 Sometime thereaf-
ter, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws proposed a similar rule. 101 More recently, both bodies
changed their positions to one more congruent with what was to
become Federal Rule of Evidence 609.102
Meanwhile, the courts, too, had been considering the appro-
priate use of prior convictions to impeach the criminal defendant/
witness. Perhaps the most influential of these decisions was Luck v.
96. See, e.g., AA. CODE § 12-21-162(a) (1996) ("No objection must be allowed
to the competency of a witness because of his conviction for any crime, except
perjury or subornation of perjury."); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &Juo. PROC. § 9-104
(1995) ("A person convicted of perjury may not testify."). But see Woods v. State,
90 So. 2d 91, 92 (Ala. Ct. App. 1956) (holding that exclusion of defendant's testi-
mony from consideration by jury violated defendant's due process rights under
state constitution); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5912 (1996) ("No person shall be deemed
incompetent.., as a witness in any criminal proceeding by reason of the person's
having been convicted of perjury .... ").
97. 3A WmMORE, supra note 91, § 980, at 835.
98. CODE OF EVID. Rules 306, 311 (Proposed Final Draft 1942).
99. See id. at Rule 106 (" [E] xtrinsic evidence shall be inadmissible (a) of traits
of his character other than honesty or veracity, or (b) of his conviction of crime not
involving dishonesty or false statement or (c) of specific instances of his conduct
relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character." (emphasis added)).
100. Id. at cmt.
101. UNIF. R. EVID. 21 (1953).
102. See UNIF. R. EVID. 609 (1974) ("For the purpose of attacking the credibil-
ity of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted
but only if the crime ... (2) involved dishonesty or false statement .... ).
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United States.103 Luck had been charged with house-breaking and
larceny. He testified in his own behalf, offering an alibi defense.
Ostensibly to attack the defendant's credibility, on cross-examina-
tion the Government elicited from the defendant, over objection,
that he had pleaded guilty to grand larceny a few years earlier. 104
On appeal, the defendant argued that the prior conviction should
not have been admitted because he was ajuvenile at the time. The
Government responded that because Luck had been tried as an
adult, the statutory limitations on the use of the results of adjudica-
tions in the juvenile court were inapplicable, and the court
agreed.105
Although the D.C. Circuit affirmed the conviction, the opinion
includes strong dicta, over the disagreement ofJudge Danaher, that
prior convictions are not necessarily admissible to impeach the
criminal defendant who elects to testify. 10 6 The court interpreted
the relevant statute to vest a sound discretion in the trial court
whether to admit or exclude prior conviction evidence aimed at
attacking the credibility of a testifying defendant.10 7 Interestingly,
among the court's reasons was that "[t]here may well be cases
where the trial judge might think that the cause of truth would be
helped more by letting the jury hear the defendant's story than by
the defendant's foregoing that opportunity because of the fear of
prejudice founded upon a prior conviction." 10 8 The court went on
to identify a number of factors that ought to inform the exercise of
the trial court's discretion: the nature of any prior offense, the
number of prior convictions, the age and circumstances of the de-
fendant (the court was not clear whether it meant at the time of the
prior convictions or the time of trial for the instant offense) and,
"above all, the extent to which it is more important to the search for
truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant's story
than to know of a prior conviction." 10 9
A year and a half later, in an opinion by then-Circuit Judge
Burger, the same court, again in dicta, spelled out in greater detail
the factors a trial court should consider in determining the admissi-
103. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
104. Id. at 766.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 767-68 ("The trial court is not required to allow impeachment by
prior conviction every time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense. The
statute ... leaves room for the operation of a sound judicial discretion .....
107. Id.
108. Id. at 768 (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 769 (emphasis added).
1997]
23
Hornstein: Between Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachme
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
bility of a testifying defendant's prior convictions for impeachment
purposes. °10 Morris Gordon had been convicted of robbery and as-
sault after a trial that turned on the jury's resolution of the conflict
between the testimony of the complainant and that of the defend-
ant. a11 The defendant's claim on appeal, in Gordon v. United States,
was that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting his
testimony to be impeached by evidence of his prior convictions.
The court used the occasion to clarify and expand the law of prior
conviction impeachment after Luck.112
As the court explained, evidence of prior convictions may have
probative force in the jury's assessment of a defendant/witness's
testimony. 113 On the other hand, making the jury aware of such
convictions also presents the potential for prejudice.1 14 Luck con-
templated a discretionary determination whereby the trial court
would weigh these competing considerations. 15 Thus, under Luck,
some convictions would be admitted while some would be ex-
cluded. Gordon attempted to formulate a set of factors that should
guide that exercise of discretion.
Under Gordon, prior convictions are presumptively admissible
on the question of credibility. 1 6 It is up to the defendant to per-
suade the court in any particular instance that any conviction
should be excluded. Moreover, the burden on the defendant is not
light. It is only when the defendant can demonstrate that the preju-
dicial impact of the prior conviction "far outweighs" its probative
value on the question of credibility that the impeaching conviction
should be excluded. 117
The court iterated that the defendant/witness's prior convic-
tions may not be used to prove the accused's bad character, but
rather, may be used only to assist the jury in assessing whether to
believe his or her testimony.11 8 Convictions for crimes involving
110. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (discussing
fear of prejudice and impeachment).
111. Id. at 938.
112. Id. at 939. The defendant had not raised the issue at trial as Luck re-
quired, and the court found no plain error. Id. at 941. Thus, the case easily could
have been disposed of without the extended discussion of impeachment by prior
conviction. Id.
113. Id. at 939.
114. Id.
115. See id. (stating that court weighs probative value of convictions against
degree of prejudice).
116. Id. at 940.
117. Id. at 939.
118. Id. at 940.
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dishonesty or deceit-such as fraud and cheating-are more proba-
tive of credibility than crimes of violence. Thus, the court sug-
gested a "'rule of thumb' . . . that convictions which rest on
dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas those of violent or
assaultive crimes generally do not."11 9
On the prejudice side of the probativity/prejudice balance, the
court noted the especially difficult problem that arises from prior
convictions for offenses similar to that for which the defendant is
currently being tried.120 In that instance, any prior conviction is
especially likely to be misused by the jury on the question of guilt
rather than be limited to consideration of credibility. Thus, such
convictions should be admitted "sparingly." 12' The remoteness of a
prior conviction might also counsel against admissibility.' 22
Among the other factors to be considered by the trial court in
determining whether to admit or exclude prior convictions, the
court singled out the effect of the defendant's failure to testify out
of fear of prejudice resulting from the jury's awareness of the prior
convictions. 23 The court stated:
Even though ajudge might find that the prior convictions
are relevant to credibility and the risk of prejudice to the
defendant does not warrant their exclusion, he may never-
theless conclude that it is more important that the jury
have the benefit of the defendant's version of the case
than to have the defendant remain silent out of fear of
impeachment.124
The Luck-Gordon approach to the problem of impeachment by
prior conviction eventually found its way into what became Rule
609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, despite some tinkering in the
details. 125 The principles underlying Luck-Gordon continue to in-
form decisions about the admissibility of prior crimes evidence to
impeach the criminal defendant who elects to testify in his own be-
half.126 Nevertheless, soon after these cases were decided, Congress
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. For a discussion of the evolution of Rule 609, see supra notes 24-45 and
accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1488 (9th Cir.) (en
banc) (concluding that prior robbery conviction was admissible under balancing
test of Rule 609(a) (1)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 210 (1995).
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amended the D.C. Code to deny courts the discretion to exclude
evidence of an accused's prior convictions if the accused elected to
testify, an approach mirrored in the initial draft of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.1 27
The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Proce-
dure Act of 1970128 removed the trial court's discretion to exclude
certain prior convictions offered to impeach the testimony of a
criminal defendant. The new rule on impeachment required the
admissibility of certain prior convictions without regard to the Luck-
Gordon analysis or to the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction.
It denied the trial court any discretion with respect to the admission
or exclusion of such evidence.
The D.C. Circuit was faced with a number of challenges to the
new rule. In most cases, however, the court declined to address the
evidentiary question squarely. For example, in United States v. Hen-
son,129 the court of appeals decided, en banc, that to apply the new
rule in trials for offenses committed prior to its enactment would
operate as an impermissible ex post facto law. 130 The court did not
consider the constitutionality of the provision simpliciter, though
there is much in the opinion suggesting the court's unhappiness
with the policy underlying the new rule.' 3 ' In determining whether
the procedural change wrought by the new rule amounted to a pro-
hibited ex post facto law, the court considered its effect on any sub-
stantial right of the accused. The denial of the accused's right to
invoke the court's discretion, informed by the Luck factors, was of
127. For a discussion of Congress's amendment of the D.C. Code and the
effect such amendment had on Luck-Gordon, see supra notes 38, 103-24, infra notes
128-58 and accompanying text.
128. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1970). The statute stated, in relevant part:
(b) (1) [F]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evi-
dence that the witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be
admitted if offered... but only if the criminal offense (A) was punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which he was convicted, or (B) involved dishonesty or false statement (re-
gardless of punishment).
Id. § 14-305(b) (1). Subsection (b) (2) (A) of § 305 stated as follows:
Evidence of a conviction of a witness is inadmissible under this section if
(i) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other
equivalent procedure granted or issued on the basis of innocence, or (ii)
the conviction has been the subject of a certificate of rehabilitation or its
equivalent and such witness has not been convicted of a subsequent crim-
inal offense.
Id. § 14-305(b) (2) (A).
129. 486 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
130. Id. at 1305.
131. See id. at 1308 ("[Ilts effect is self-evident even if it may not be
unconstitutional.").
[Vol. 42: p. 1
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/1
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION
sufficient magnitude to implicate the ex post facto clause. The
court explained that impeaching the accused by prior conviction
prejudices the accused in two distinct ways. First, the evidence of
past convictions is likely to be misused despite limiting instructions,
in effect lowering the burden of proof on the prosecution.13 2 Sec-
ond, the court recognized the effect of the admission of past of-
fenses on the accused's right to testify in his own behalf: "[W] hile
he had the right to testify in his own behalf, it may nonetheless be a
significantly diluted right if the risk of the above-described preju-
dice ... is so high that he is deterred from invoking that right."133
The rule challenged in Henson denied the trial court discretion
to exclude prior convictions offered to impeach the accused. The
court seemed to assume, for purposes of its analysis, that there were
circumstances in which impeachment by prior conviction would be
constitutionally permissible. Indeed, Luck is grounded on such an
assumption.13 4 The challenged rule itself might pass constitutional
muster apart from the ex post facto issues present in the case. The
court noted that Congress "presumably may have concluded that
the governmental interest [in the admission of prior convictions to
impeach the accused] should in any event prevail."13 5 But it also
noted the existence of prejudice to the accused "whether or not the
judgment is otherwise constitutionally permissible."13 6
The Henson court did suggest that impeachment by prior con-
viction would survive a constitutional challenge based on balancing
the prejudicial impact of the prior conviction evidence against the
governmental interest in admitting the evidence for its impeaching
effect. But the court did not decide that issue. More important,
the court did not consider the impact of the admissibility of prior
convictions on the defendant's right to testify. The court's sugges-
tion of constitutionality relied on Spencer v. Texas,137 which, as we
shall see, did not address the problem of the effect of prior convic-
tion evidence on the right of the defendant to testify.' 38
132. Id. at 1307.
133. Id. at 1308.
134. See id. at 1307 (noting that under Luck approach, rule aimed at protect-
ing defendant from unfair prejudice arising from admission of prior convictions,
"may be overborne by the governmental interest in admitting the evidence for
impeachment purposes, but that prejudice exists nonetheless").
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
138. For a consideration of the effect the admissibility of prior conviction evi-
dence has on a defendant's right to testify in his or her own defense, see supra
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Following Henson, the D.C. Circuit decided two cases it had
held in abeyance pending its en banc disposition of Henson. Both
United States v. Hairston139 and United States v. Belt1 40 also presented
challenges to the new D.C. Code rule mandating the admission of
prior convictions to impeach. In neither case, however, were the
offenses committed prior to the adoption of the new rule; hence,
the ex post facto analysis of Henson was inapplicable.1 41
In Hairston, the court expressed the same policy fears as it had
in Henson: The effect of admitting prior convictions might be to
lower the Government's burden of proof and the right of the ac-
cused to testify in his own behalf might be diluted.142 As in Henson,
however, the court did not reach the question of the defendant's
right to testify free of the fear that his prior convictions would be
revealed to the jury.
The defendant in Hairston had been tried for violations of fed-
eral narcotics laws. At trial, the Government had argued success-
fully for the application of the new D.C. Code provisions mandating
the admission of prior convictions against testifying defendants.
The court of appeals distinguished prosecutions for violations of
the D.C. Code from those for violations of the U.S. Code, holding
that the D.C. Code impeachment provisions were applicable only in
trials for D.C. Code offenses.143 Because the defendants were
charged with U.S. Code offenses, the D.C. Code evidence provi-
sions were inapplicable. 144 Anticipating future cases, the court indi-
cated that the result should be the same in cases in which both D.C.
Code offenses and U.S. Code offenses were charged. 145 Thus, once
again, the court avoided the question of the constitutionality of a
rule requiring the admission of prior convictions to impeach a testi-
fying defendant, while noting the possibility of "due process limita-
tions" on such a rule.146
notes 84-86 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Spencer v. Texas, see infra
notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
139. 495 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
140. 514 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
141. Hairston, 495 F.2d at 1048.
142. Id. at 1050.
143. Id. at 1054-56.
144. Id. at 1056.
145. Id. at 1054 n.13. Thus, only where D.C. Code offenses are charged does
the D.C. evidence provision apply, denying the trial court discretion to exclude
evidence of prior convictions to impeach the testifying defendant. Id.
146. See i. at 1051 ("That is ajudgment which, subject possibly to due process
limitations, Congress is fully capable of making .... ").
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Finally, in Belt, the D.C. Circuit decided the constitutional
question it had managed to avoid in the earlier cases. Belt was an en
banc consideration of four cases consolidated on appeal. In one of
these cases the defendant was charged with both D.C. Code and
U.S. Code offenses. The en banc court adopted the view held by
the panel in Hairston, holding that in cases in which both D.C. Code
offenses and U.S. Code offenses were charged, the D.C. Code evi-
dence provision requiring admission of a testifying defendant's
prior convictions to impeach would not apply. 147 Because the D.C.
Code provisions were inapplicable to the U.S. Code offense, it
would foster confusion to apply them to other offenses being tried
simultaneously. Thus, both offenses were to be tried under federal
evidence law as articulated in Luck-Gordon.'48
The remaining three cases considered in Belt involved prosecu-
tions only under the D.C. Code. The defendants argued that the
D.C. Code evidentiary rule should not apply to any trial in the
United States District Court of the District of Columbia, but only to
trials in the District of Columbia Superior Court.1 49 The court dis-
tinguished Hairston on the ground that it involved only U.S. Code
offenses, while only D.C. Code offenses were involved in the instant
cases. 150 Thus, if constitutional, the D.C. Code evidentiary rule ap-
plied, requiring the admission of prior convictions to impeach a
testifying defendant.
The court then, at last, turned to the constitutional ques-
tion.15 As presented in Belt, the question was whether requiring
admission of prior convictions to impeach the testifying defendant
147. United States v. Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also Hairston,
495 F.2d at 1054 n.13 ("[]t would appear that the federal forum's evidentiary law
would govern impeachment by prior conviction.").
148. For a consideration of federal evidence law as discussed in Luck and
Gordon, see supra notes 103-26 and accompanying text.
149. Belt, 514 F.2d at 842. Section 11-502(3) of the D.C. Code provides that
the United States District Court has jurisdiction over "[a] ny offense under any law
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia which offense is joined in the
same information or indictment with any Federal offense." D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-
502(3) (1981). Section 23-311(b) of the D.C. Code states:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or infor-
mation . . . even though one or more is in violation of the laws of the
United States and another is in violation of the laws applicable exclusively
to the District of Columbia and may be prosecuted as provided in Section
11-502(3).
Id. § 23-311(b). See generally Joan E. Hartman, Federal and Local Jurisdiction in the
District of Columbia, 92 YALE Li. 292 (1982) (discussing alternative bases forjurisdic-
tion of district courts over joined D.C. Code offenses).
150. Belt, 514 F.2d at 843.
151. Id. at 846.
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violated the fair trial guarantees embodied in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. 52 A panel of the court had decided earlier that it
was not per se unconstitutional to permit a testifying defendant to
be impeached by prior convictions. 153 Thus, if Belt were to uphold
the D.C. Code's mandatory admission of prior convictions to im-
peach the testifying defendant, the panel decision in the earlier
case would be reaffirmed afortiori. That earlier decision found the
claim of unconstitutionality "not insubstantial," but foreclosed by
Spencer v. Texas.1 54 Belt was a more difficult case because the admis-
sibility of the prior convictions was mandated rather than permit-
ted; the trial court in Belt lacked discretion to exclude the prior
convictions.
Moreover, there was some language in Spencer suggesting that
"'[t]he defendants' interests [were] protected by limiting instruc-
tions ... and by the discretion residing with the trial judge to limit
or forbid the admission of particularly prejudicial evidence .... ,,'155
Precisely this argument had been made in an earlier case, Dixon v.
United States,156 before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
The court in Dixon, as in Belt, concluded, essentially, that the Spencer
language with respect to the importance of discretion was mere dic-
tum and that:
[It] could not bear the weight sought to be attributed to it,
that is to say, it cannot be characterized as a conscious and
purposeful assertion by the Supreme Court that a statute
permitting impeachment by prior conviction is bad on its
face if it makes no provision in terms for the exercise of
discretion.1 57
Thus, the court in Belt found no constitutional bar to the rule re-
quiring admission of prior convictions to impeach the defendant
who elects to testify in his or her own behalf, in part because the
court gave little weight to the qualifying language in Spencer.
Afortiori, then, the same court's earlier panel decision in United
States v. Bailey158 was reaffirmed en banc. Bailey had argued both
that the admission of his prior convictions was an abuse of the trial
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing United States v. Bailey, 426 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
154. 385 U.S. 554 (1967); Belt, 514 F.2d at 846.
155. Belt, 514 F.2d at 848 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561
(1967)).
156. 287 A.2d 89 (D.D.C. 1972).
157. Belt, 514 F.2d at 848 (citing Dixon, 287 A.2d at 94-95).
158. 426 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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court's discretion and that it violated the defendants' constitutional
rights to due process. The due process argument essentially mir-
rored the abuse of discretion argument, both being based on the
notion that the probative value of the prior conviction evidence on
the question of the defendants' credibility was so far overwhelmed
by its prejudicial effect as to undermine the fairness of the trial.
Bailey, Belt and other cases 159 permitting impeachment of the
testifying defendant by prior conviction, relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Spencer v. Texas. Yet a close reading of
Spencer reveals that it is not dispositive. Spencer did not involve im-
peachment by prior conviction. In each of the three cases before
the Court, the petitioner challenged the Texas procedure under
which he was convicted and sentenced. Under Texas law, the jury
was to be informed of the defendants' prior convictions and either
enhance each defendant's punishment based thereon or make a
finding of the prior conviction on which the court would base en-
hanced punishment. 160 In each case the jury was instructed that
prior convictions should not be used as evidence of guilt of the
crime for which each petitioner was being tried.' 61 The Court re-
jected the petitioners' claim that the evidence of prior convictions
unconstitutionally prejudiced them because a less prejudicial pro-
cedure might have been employed and because the jury instruction
might have been ineffective to correct the prejudice. 162
In affirming the convictions, the Court noted a number of in-
stances in which evidence of prior convictions had been found ad-
missible despite its obvious prejudicial effect. 163 On the Court's list
of examples was impeachment of a defendant who elects to tes-
tify.164 This dictum-that impeachment of the testifying defendant
159. E.g., Leno v. Gaughan, 664 F.2d 314, 315 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
("[Sipencer is dispositive of defendant's claim.").
160. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 556.
161. Id. at 555-56.
162. Id. at 563. The Court stated:
We recognize that the use of prior-crime evidence in a one-stage recidivist
trial may be thought to represent a less cogent state interest than does its
use for other purposes, in that other procedures for applying enhance-
ment-of-sentence statutes may be available to the State that are not suited
in the other situations in which evidence is introduced. We do not think
this distinction should lead to a different constitutional result.
Id.
163. Id. at 560 (citing Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949)
(showing intent); Moss v. State, 364 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (showing
malice); Chavira v. State, 319 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958) (showing
identity)).
164. Id. at 561 (citing Giacone v. State, 62 S.W.2d 986 (Tex. Crim. App.
1933)).
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by prior convictions is constitutionally permissible-can hardly be
"characterized as a conscious and purposeful assertion by the
Supreme Court."165
Moreover, Spencer addressed the question whether the admis-
sion of evidence of prior convictions against a criminal defendant
simpliciter violated a general due process right to fair procedure. 166
Indeed, the Court distinguished Jackson v. Denno,167 relied on by the
petitioners, in part on just this ground. In Jackson, the Court had
held it impermissible to introduce a defendant's confession with no
prior judicial finding of voluntariness and to instruct the jury to
consider the confession if, but only if, it found the confession to
have been given voluntarily. 168 In distinguishingJackson, the Spencer
Court noted that the Jackson procedure, designed to insulate the
jury from prejudicial evidence, was aimed at "protection of a spe-
cific constitutional right .... In the procedures [in Spencer], in
contrast, no specific federal right ... is involved; reliance is placed
solely on a general 'fairness' approach. 1 69
The Court's most recent pronouncement on the admissibility
of evidence of prior convictions against a criminal defendant, Old
Chief v. United States,170 is instructive. The petitioner had been con-
victed of violating a federal statute that prohibited the possession of
a firearm by a person who had previously been convicted of a fel-
ony. He had sought to prevent the prosecution from introducing
the nature of his prior felony conviction by offering to stipulate to
the existence of that element of the offense-an offer the prosecu-
tion refused to accept, arguing that it was entitled to prove its case
in its own way. Both the trial court and the court of appeals agreed.
The Supreme Court reversed Old Chiefs conviction on the theory
that his willingness to stipulate to the prior conviction rendered un-
fairly prejudicial the Government's introduction of the name and
nature of that conviction. 171
The Court recognized the prosecution's interest in developing
its case with full evidentiary force. Typically, a defendant may not
stipulate his way out of the "fair and legitimate weight" of the Gov-
ernment's evidence by a bare admission. 172 But the Government's
165. United States v. Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
166. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 559.
167. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
168. Id. at 393-94.
169. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 565.
170. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 653 (citing Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958)).
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interest in "telling a colorful story with descriptive richness" is less
pressing when the element of the offense to be proved is some sta-
tus independent of the particular criminal behavior charged. 173
Thus, Old Chief's status as a previously convicted felon did not re-
quire the kind of evidentiary context as would proof of the current
behavior in which he had engaged in committing the offense. In
effect, the Court found the question of the defendant's status as a
previously convicted felon to be a collateral element of the offense,
for which proof of the bare fact was sufficient; the offered stipula-
tion served that purpose. 174
The dissent argued that it is not unfairly prejudicial "for the
Government to directly prove an essential element" of the offense
with which the defendant has been charged.' 75 Noting that Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b) permits evidence of prior crimes for a
number of purposes, the dissent urged:
The list is plainly not exhaustive, and where, as here, a
prior conviction is an element of the charged offense,
neither Rule 404(b) nor Rule 403 can bar its admis-
sion .... Because the Government bears the burden of
proof on every essential element of a charged offense, it
must be accorded substantial leeway to submit evidence of
its choosing to prove its case. 176
In short, the dissent did not accept the distinction drawn by the
majority of a collateral element of the offense.
Old Chief turned on the Court's interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. It was not of constitutional dimension. Never-
theless, the opinion recognized that there are circumstances in
which it is unfairly prejudicial to a criminal defendant to allow the
jury to learn of prior convictions unless some substantial legitimate
purpose is served by such evidence. Moreover, the opinions suggest
a different standard of admissibility for prior convictions that are an
essential element of the offense for which the defendant is being
tried and other uses less central to the case. Whatever may be said
of the differences between the majority's and the dissent's analyses,
the use of prior convictions as an impeachment tool plainly is more
attenuated than its use to prove an element of the offense for which
the defendant is being tried. Yet, even in the latter circumstance,
173. Id. at 654-56.
174. Id. at 655.
175. Id. at 657, 660 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 657-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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prior conviction evidence may be unfairly prejudicial. A fortiori,
prior conviction impeachment raises substantial issues of unfair
prejudice.
Given Spencers disavowal of a "general fairness approach" to
prohibit the admission of prior conviction evidence, it is unlikely
that the Court would find constitutional underpinnings to its deci-
sion in Old Chief. Nevertheless, the case suggests the underlying val-
ues at stake. Moreover, a rule permitting the introduction of prior
convictions against a criminal defendant conditioned on the de-
fendant's election to testify stands on a quite different footing from
the generalized right not to have prior conviction evidence intro-
duced. Indeed, a rule permitting prior convictions or other charac-
ter evidence to be considered even on the determination of the
defendant's guilt of the crime charged, 177 while it would raise seri-
ous policy questions, might present a weaker constitutional case
than conditioning admissibility on the defendant's assertion of the
right to testify.
It is not simply the protection of the defendant from the preju-
dicial effect of prior convictions that is at stake.1 78 At stake is the
quite specific right of the defendant to take the stand to testify in
his or her own behalf. That right, of course, was not at issue in
Spencer. In Spencer, the defendants' prior convictions were admissi-
ble under the challenged Texas procedure regardless of whether
the defendants' elected to testify. Indeed, it is especially notewor-
thy that the defendant's right to testify in his or her own behalf had
not been formally recognized at the time Spencer was decided. The
Supreme Court announced that right twenty-two years later, in Rock
v. Arkansas. 179
177. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 677 n.99 (noting that Justice Department
recognizes that it is improper "to penalize any defendant who has previously com-
mitted acts suggesting dishonesty for exercising his right to testify"); cf FED. R.
EVIB. 413-415 (permitting introduction of defendant's prior acts of sexual assault
or child molestation in criminal and civil cases in which defendant is accused of
either act).
178. Most of the cases challenging the admissibility of prior convictions to
impeach treat the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction evidence as primary.
Consequently, the failure of a defendant to testify, which precludes the admission
of the prior conviction evidence, deprives the defendant of standing to raise the
issue on appeal. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 42 (1984). The theory of this
Article is that it is precisely the defendant's constrained decision not to testify that
is the constitutional injury.
179. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
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III. THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY
A. History
Although perhaps taken as a matter of course today, the consti-
tutional right to testify came to be recognized only relatively re-
cently. Despite ambiguous English antecedents-a defendant was
permitted to make a case before the jury, though not to offer sworn
testimony-before the adoption of the Constitution, criminal de-
fendants were disqualified from testifying based on their interest in
the outcome, both in England and in the Colonies.180 When the
Constitution was adopted, the defendant still had no right to
testify. 181
By the mid-nineteenth century-largely due to the influence of
Bentham's Rationale of Judicial Evidence--both England and the
United States had abolished incompetency on grounds of interest
in civil cases. 182 Nonetheless, criminal defendants were still barred
from testifying in their own behalf. It was not until 1864 that any
jurisdiction in the English-speaking world permitted the criminal
defendant to testify generally in his or her own behalf.'8 3 In that
year, Maine adopted a statute ending the incompetency of criminal
defendants to testify, 184 although an earlier provision permitted the
defendant to testify in certain cases.185 The general statute can
probably be attributed to the influence of Maine's Chief Justice,
John Appleton, who argued for the right of parties, civil or crimi-
nal, to testify. 186
By the turn of this century, every state, except Georgia, had
recognized the right of the criminal defendant to testify. 187 Fur-
ther, Congress had also adopted a federal statute recognizing the
180. The King v. Lukens, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 5, 6 (1762), quoted in Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1961); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 91, § 575, at 809.
181. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971) ("Inasmuch as at
the time of the framing of the First Amendment and for many years thereafter the
accused in criminal cases was not allowed to testify in his own behalf . ).
182. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 91, § 576, at 686-89 & n.1.
183. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577 (noting Maine's decision in 1864 to enact
general competency statute for criminal defendants); Timothy P. O'Neill, Vindicat-
ing the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Testify at Criminal Trial: The Need for an On-
the-Record Waiver, 51 U. PITT L. REV. 809, 815 (1990) (same).
184. 1964 Me. Laws 280.
185. 1859 Me. Acts 104.
186. JOHN APPLETON, APPLETON ON RULES OF EVIDENCE 123-24 (1860); see also
Robert Popper, History and Development of the Accused's Right to Testify, 1962 WASH. U.
L.Q. 454, 460-63 (1962) (discussing Appleton's influence in promoting change
that allowed criminal defendants to testify in own behalf).
187. O'Neill, supra note 183, at 815.
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competency of criminal defendants to testify.188 The right recog-
nized, however, typically was a creature of statute. It was not of con-
stitutional dimension.
B. Rock and its Progenitors
As late as a year before the Court declared in Rock that a crimi-
nal defendant had a constitutional right to testify, the Court had
recognized that it had not theretofore "explicitly held that a crimi-
nal defendant has a due process right to testify in his own be-
half."18 9 Although no such explicit holding may have existed, then-
recent history was replete with suggestions of such a right. As early
as 1948, in In re Oliver,190 the Court spoke of the defendant's "right
... to offer testimony" as part of the due process right to be heard
that the Court had recognized earlier.1 91
By 1961, Georgia still had not recognized the defendant's right
to testify, though it did permit the defendant the statutory right to
make an unsworn statement to the jury (and thus to remain insu-
lated from cross-examination).1 92 Billy Ferguson wanted his law-
yer's assistance in making his unsworn statement to the jury during
his trial for murder in Georgia.1 93 Specifically, he wanted his lawyer
to be permitted to question him so he could make his statement in
the form of answers to these questions. The Georgia trial court re-
fused to permit the requested procedure, and Ferguson was con-
victed. The case seemed a likely vehicle for the Supreme Court to
recognize the constitutional right of a defendant to testify in his
own behalf. Unfortunately, Ferguson had not challenged Georgia's
incompetency statute, nor had he sought to be sworn as a wit-
ness.194 Consequently, there was no occasion for the Court to rule
on the right to testify. The Court ruled the Georgia procedure vio-
lated the defendant's right to have counsel assist in his defense.1 95
188. Act of Mar. 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481
(1994)).
189. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).
190. 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
191. Id.; see also Holden v. Harvey, 169 U.S. 366, 390-91 (1898) ("Recognizing
the difficulty in defining . . . 'due process of law,' it is certain that these words
imply... that no one shall be condemned in his person ... without an opportu-
nity to be heard in his own defence."); Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897)
("Can it be doubted that due process of law signifies a right to be heard in one's
defence?").
192. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415 (Harrison 1933).
193. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
194. Id. at 572 & n.1.
195. Id. at 596.
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Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that Georgia's
rule of incompetency may have been the last rule of its kind in the
common law world. 196 The concurring Justices Frankfurter1 97 and
Clark' 98 would have found it unconstitutional to hold the criminal
defendant incompetent to testify in his own behalf.
Not long after Ferguson, Georgia recognized the defendant's
right to testify.' 99 With every state and the federal government rec-
ognizing a defendant's (statutory) right to testify, it seemed unlikely
that the Supreme Court would have the opportunity to consider
whether the right was of constitutional magnitude. Yet, in subse-
quent cases, the Court seemed to assume that it was. For example,
in Harris v. New York, 200 both the majority and the dissenting opin-
ions found common ground in the notion that the defendant's
choice whether to remain silent or to testify was of constitutional
significance. Similarly, in Brooks v. Tennessee,201 the Court noted
that " [w] hether the defendant is to testify is... a matter of constitu-
tional right."202 The Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. Califor-
nia,20 3 upholding the defendant's right to refuse counsel and "to
make his defense,"20 4 also suggested a constitutional right to tes-
tify.205 Despite some exceptions, 20 6 the clear trend in the lower
courts also favored a constitutional basis for the right to testify. 20 7
196. Id. at 570.
197. Id. at 600-01.
198. Id. at 602.
199. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415 (Harrison 1962) ("In all criminal trials, the pris-
oner shall have the right to make to the court and jury such statement in the case
as he may deem proper in his defense.").
200. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
201. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
202. Id. at 612; see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("It is also
recognized that the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamen-
tal decisions regarding the case, as to whether to... testify in his or her own behalf
.... .).
203. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
204. Id. at 819 & n.15.
205. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 56 n.2 (1978) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart stated:
The accused in a federal case has an absolute right to plead not guilty,
and if he does elect to go to trial an absolute statutory right to testify in
his own behalf. I cannot believe that the latter is not also a constitutional
right, for the right of a defendant under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments "to make his defense" surely must encompass the right to
testify in his own behalf.
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
206. O'Neill, supra note 183, at 819 n.75.
207. See id. at n.74 (listing collected cases that signify trend among lower
courts favoring constitutional right to testify).
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The right to testify was perhaps most fully elaborated by the
Supreme Court in Rock v. Arkansas.208 The question for the Court
in Rock was the validity of Arkansas's rule excluding all hypnotically
refreshed testimony when applied to the criminal defendant. Rock
wished to offer her hypnotically refreshed recollection of the events
surrounding her shooting of her husband, which would have sup-
ported the contention that the gun had fired accidentally. 20 9 There
was expert testimony that the gun was defective in a way that might
have caused it to fire when dropped or hit, even if the trigger had
not been pulled. The trial court refused to permit the defendant to
testify based on her hypnotically refreshed recollection and limited
her testimony to her recollections prior to the hypnosis. 210 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court affirmed Rock's manslaughter conviction,
adopting a per se rule against hypnotically induced testimony over
the defendant's claim that such a rule violated her constitutional
right to testify in her own behalf 211
The Supreme Court held the application of a per se rule ex-
cluding hypnotically refreshed testimony of a criminally accused vi-
olated the defendant's right to testify.212 The Court began its
analysis by recognizing the undoubted right of a criminal defend-
ant "to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own de-
fense."21 3 The Court recognized that at common law, criminal
defendants, like all other parties to litigation, were incompetent to
testify because their interest in the outcome rendered their testi-
mony untrustworthy. Nevertheless, by the time of its holding in Fer-
guson v. Georgia, the Court had noted that "decades ago the
considered consensus of the English-speaking world came to be
that there was no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn
testimony of the accused." 214
In Rock, the Court found the constitutional right of a criminal
defendant to testify rooted in several provisions of the Constitution.
208. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
209. Id. at 46-49.
210. Id. at 47.
211. Id. at 48-49.
212. Id. at 61-62. During oral argument, counsel for the State of Arkansas
repeatedly referred to one of the witnesses, a neuropsychologist, as a "psycho-psy-
chologist." Justice Scalia interrupted the argument, asking "What is a psycho-psy-
chologist? A psychologist with a stutter?" RODNEY JONES & GERALD UELMEN,
SUPREME FOLLY 154 (1990). Although this bit of information has virtually no rele-
vance to the thesis of this Article, the author believes that the diligent footnote
reader is entitled to what little entertainment can be smuggled in.
213. Rock, 483 U.S. at 49.
214. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961).
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The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees the defendant the right to call witnesses in his or her behalf.
"Logically included in the accused's right to call witnesses ... is the
right to testify himself .... -215 Moreover, the Court recognized
that "the most important witness for the defense in many criminal
cases is the defendant himself. ' 216 The Court relied on its prior
holding in Faretta, which concerned the right of a criminal defend-
ant to represent himself, to assert afortiori the defendant's right to
testify. Citing Faretta, the Court in Rock stated that "[e]ven more
fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representa-
tion... is an accused's right to present his own version of events in
his own words."217
The Court also found a right to testify implicit in the Fifth
Amendment's right to remain silent: "The opportunity to testify is
also a necessary corollary to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee
against compelled testimony. ' 218 Just as criminal defendants have a
right not to testify in their own behalf,2 19 they also have a right to
testify. Indeed, one might think that the right to testify is even
more important than the right to remain silent. Finally, and per-
haps most telling, the Court found the right to testify in one's own
behalf among the rights essential to due process of law. 220
Of course, to establish a right to testify is not to say that the
right is without limit. Like most other rights, the right to testify can
be waived. There is some controversy, however, over just what is
necessary to constitute such a waiver.221 Although a number of arti-
215. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975)).
218. Id.
219. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892) (holding that crimi-
nal defendant was entitled to refuse to testify).
220. Rock, 483 U.S. at 51.
221. Compare People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514-15 (Colo. 1984) (en banc)
(holding that trial court should advise and warn defendant on record of right not
to testify and ramifications of decision in order to ensure informed waiver and
prevent post-conviction disputes), and State v. Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77, 82 (W. Va.
1988) (adopting Curtis rule), with United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 760 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that court has no duty to ensure that on-the-record waiver has
occurred); State v. Allie, 710 P.2d 430, 438 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that sua sponte
inquiry by trial court as to whether defendant desires to testify is neither necessary
nor appropriate); State v. Paradise, 567 A.2d 1221, 1230 (Conn. 1990) (holding
that trial judge had no duty to canvass defendant regarding his waiver of right to
testify on his own behalf); Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403, 410-11 (Fla.
1988) (ruling that right to testify does not have to be waived on record); Aragon v.
State, 760 P.2d 1174, 1179 (Idaho 1988) (same); Commonwealth v. Hennessey,
502 N.E.2d 943, 946-48 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (same), and People v. Simmons, 364
N.W.2d 783, 785 (Mich. 1985) (same).
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cles have investigated the appropriate procedural safeguards coinci-
dent with a finding of waiver,222 there has been scant attention paid
to the degree to which the defendant's choice whether to testify is
unfairly weighted by making assertion of the right prohibitively
costly. If the price of exercising the right to testify is that the jury
learns of a defendant's prior criminal record-evidence that would
otherwise be inadmissible-defendants are often likely to "waive"
the right. Waiver is a likely consequence of imposing such a bur-
den on the exercise of the right.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: BURDENING THE
RIGHT TO TESTIFY
A. Burdening the Exercise of Constitutional Rights
The counterpart of a defendant's right to testify is his or her
right to refuse to testify-to remain silent. The courts have long
recognized that the accused in a criminal proceeding has a consti-
tutional right to refuse to testify.22 3 Griffin v. California224 recog-
nized that it was impermissible to burden a defendant's assertion of
the constitutional right without some governmental interest at
stake.225 In Griffin, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of
the California Constitution that permitted the prosecution to com-
ment on an accused's exercise of the right not to testify and author-
ized a jury instruction that an adverse inference could be drawn
from the defendant's failure to testify in his or her own behalf. The
Court reasoned that allowing comment on the defendant's failure
to testify, thus encouraging the jury to draw an adverse inference
from that failure, would impose an unwarranted penalty on the de-
fendant's exercise of the right to remain silent.22 6 Griffin itself ad-
dressed prosecutorial comment and judicial instructions on the
222. E.g., O'Neill, supra note 183, at 826-29 (discussing federal mechanisms
used to ensure that defendants understand their rights and that waiver of rights
are matters of record); Marjorie Rifken, The Criminal Defendant's Right to Testify:
The Right to Be Seen But Not Heard, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 253, 266 (1989)
("Given the lack of uniform judicial procedures for establishing waiver at criminal
trials, defendants are generally unaware that their silence and failure to assert the
right to testify may constitute waiver.").
223. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 586. The right is applicable in state as well as
federal courts. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
224. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
225. Id. at 613-14.
226. See id. at 614 ("[C]omment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the
'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,' which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.")
(citation omitted).
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adverse inference from the defendant's refusal to testify.2 27 Subse-
quent cases, however, make it clear that the constitutional right to
silence goes beyond Griffin's limited holding.228 Not only are the
court and the prosecutor precluded from commenting adversely on
the defendant's failure to testify, but the defendant is entitled, on
request, to an instruction that the jury may draw no inference from
the defendant's silence.229 In the absence of a legitimate govern-
mental interest, the prosecution may not erect barriers to the asser-
tion of the right to remain silent.
If, as Griffin declares, it is unconstitutional to exact a penalty in
exchange for the exercise of the right to remain silent, one would
expect, afortiori, a similar result if the defendant were to be penal-
ized for his or her election to testify. Yet, that is precisely the conse-
quence of a rule permitting the jury to learn of a defendant's prior
convictions only if the defendant elects to testify, but not otherwise.
The testifying defendant pays the heavy price of the revelation of
prior convictions-a burden not borne by the defendant who re-
fuses to testify.
230
Not all burdens on the exercise of constitutional rights are per
se unconstitutional, but the Government must demonstrate, at
least, that some legitimate governmental purpose is served by the
227. See id. ("What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one
thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into
evidence against him is quite another.").
228. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (holding that upon request
defendant is entitled to jury instruction that jury may draw no inference from de-
fendant's silence); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1972) (finding state
statute unconstitutional that required defendants choosing to testify to take stand
before calling any other witnesses on own behalf, and holding that statute "'cuts
down on the privilege (to remain silent) by making its assertion costly"' (quoting
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614)). In Brooks the Court observed:
[A] defendant may not know at the close of the State's case whether his
own testimony will be necessary or even helpful to his cause. Rather than
risk the dangers of taking the stand, he might prefer to remain silent at
that point, putting off his testimony until its value can be realistically as-
sessed. Yet, under the Tennessee rule, he cannot make that choice "in
the unfettered exercise of his own will." [The Tennessee rule] exacts a
price for his silence by keeping him off the stand entirely unless he
chooses to testify first. This, we think, casts a heavy burden on a defend-
ant's otherwise unconditional right not to take the stand.
Id. (footnote omitted).
229. Carter, 450 U.S. at 305.
230. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 678-80 (proposing abolition of all charac-
ter impeachment of criminal defendants who elect to testify and suggesting that
such a rule might justify eliminating protection afforded defendant by Griffin).
Professor Friedman suggested: "The inhibiting effect of anticipated character im-
peachment evidence is probably the principal factor supporting the rule of Griffin
v. California ...... Id. at 639.
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burden. For example, Corbitt v. New Jersey23l reaffirmed earlier plea
bargaining cases23 2 in which, apodictically, the defendant forgoes
the exercise of a constitutional right in exchange for some reward,
or to put it conversely, suffers some detriment for the exercise of a
constitutional right, typically the right to a trial. Corbitt had been
convicted of first degree murder by a jury and was sentenced to a
mandatory term of life imprisonment. Under New Jersey law, he
could have avoided the mandatory life sentence by pleading non
vult-the sentencing judge would then have had the discretion to
impose a lesser term. 23 3 Corbitt relied on the Court's decision in
United States v. Jackson.234 In Jackson, the Court held unconstitu-
tional the death penalty provision of the federal antikidnapping
statute because only the jury could impose the death penalty, and
this might discourage defendants from exercising their right to trial
byjury.2 35 Because the Government's interest could be served with-
out this cost to the accused, the statutory scheme was held
unconstitutional.
Relying on Jackson, Corbitt argued that the New Jersey proce-
dure was unconstitutional because it burdened his right to a jury
trial by subjecting him to the risk of a mandatory life sentence, a
risk that could be avoided if he chose to forego the right. The
Court distinguished Jackson on two grounds, though neither was de-
terminative. First, unlike Jackson, Corbitt did not involve the death
penalty, "'unique in its severity and irrevocability."' 23 6 Second, the
statutory scheme in Jackson permitted the defendant to avoid the
death penalty entirely by waiving his right to a jury trial. The New
Jersey statutory scheme at issue in Corbitt, by contrast, permitted a
sentence of life imprisonment even on a plea of non vult. All that
the defendant could avoid by foregoing his trial rights was a
mandatory life sentence.
More important, however, the Court made clear, "[t] he cases
in this Court since Jackson have clearly established that not every
burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pres-
231. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
232. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61
(1971); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1970); Parker v. North Caro-
lina, 397 U.S. 790, 793 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769 (1970).
233. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 215-16.
234. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
235. Id. at 572.
236. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 217 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187
(1976)).
[Vol. 42: p. I
42
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/1
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION
sure or encouragement to waive such a right is invalid."237 Indeed,
it is impossible to imagine that a system that includes plea bargain-
ing could survive were this not the case. It is noteworthy that most
of the cases in which the Court has rejected the argument that it is
unconstitutional to impose burdens on a defendant's exercise of a
constitutional right have arisen in the plea bargaining context.238 It
is tempting to limit the reach of these cases by the needs of a system
that depends on the plea bargaining process. There are, however, a
number of cases in which similar arguments were made outside the
context of plea bargaining.
Chaffin v. Stynthcombe239 furnishes an example. In Chaffin, the
habeas corpus petitioner had been convicted of robbery and sen-
tenced by the jury to fifteen years imprisonment. The conviction
was reversed, and the jury in the petitioner's second trial imposed a
sentence of life imprisonment. The second jury was unaware of the
sentence imposed by the first jury. After the state courts had de-
nied his appeal, 240 the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in the
federal courts. The petitioner claimed that the imposition of a
higher sentence after a successful appeal violated his rights under
North Carolina v. Pearce.241 Pearce had held it unconstitutional for a
judge to impose a higher sentence on retrial as punishment of the
accused for having appealed successfully.24 2 The district court de-
nied the writ, and the court of appeals affirmed. To resolve a con-
flict among the courts of appeals, 243 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 244 The Court affirmed, distinguishing sentences im-
posed by juries from those imposed byjudges. In the former situa-
tion, there is nothing to suggest that the second, higher sentence is
vindictively imposed. So long as the higher sentence is not deemed
a punishment for the exercise of the right to appeal the former
conviction, due process is satisfied. 245 After considering and deny-
ing the petitioner's contentions that the Double Jeopardy Clause
and the Due Process Clause prohibited a more severe sentence on
retrial, the Court addressed the claim that a higher sentence was
237. Id. at 218.
238. The plea bargaining cases in which the Court has rejected arguments
concerning the unconstitutionality of imposing burdens on the exercise of a con-
stitutional right by a criminal defendant, see supra note 232 and infra note 247.
239. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
240. Chaffin v. Georgia, 180 S.E.2d 741 (1971).
241. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
242. Id. at 725.
243. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 21 n.6.
244. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 409 U.S. 912 (1972), affd, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
245. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 35.
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impermissible because it would have a "chilling effect" on the exer-
cise of the "right to challenge [a] first conviction either by direct
appeal or collateral attack, ''246 a claim quite similar to the chilling
effect that impeachment by prior conviction might have on the
right of the criminal defendant to testify in his or her own behalf.
Relying on a number of subsequent decisions upholding plea
bargains despite their obvious discouragement of the defendant's
choice to stand trial,247 the Court again distinguished Jackson, de-
claring that the Constitution does not prohibit "every government-
imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of dis-
couraging the exercise of constitutional rights." 248 In the post-Jack-
son plea bargaining cases, "the imposition of these difficult choices
was upheld as an inevitable attribute of any legitimate system which
tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas." 249 These cases
can be taken as supporting the notion that an otherwise legitimate
practice that requires the defendant to risk harsher treatment for
the exercise of his or her constitutional right is not for that reason
alone rendered impermissible. 250 The Court in Chaffin applied the
standard it found in the plea bargaining cases and upheld the har-
sher sentence imposed by the jury after retrial. Critical to the deci-
sion was the legitimacy ofjury sentencing and the majority's finding
of the complete absence of any hint of vindictiveness toward the
defendant for his earlier, successful appeal.
246. Id. at 29.
247. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (finding guilty
plea that represents voluntary and intelligent choice among alternatives available
to defendant is not compelled merely because it is entered to avoid possibility of
death penalty); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 795 (1970) (recognizing
that otherwise valid plea may not be involuntary simply because it is induced by
defendant's desire to limit possible maximum penalty to less than that authorized
if there is jury trial); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970) (holding plea
bargain constitutional even if motivated in part to avoid possible death sentence).
248. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 30.
249. Id. at 31.
250. The dissenting Justices addressed a somewhat different issue: the differ-
ence in treatment accorded defendants retried before ajury and those who waive a
jury in favor of a bench trial. If North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), limits
judicial sentencing on retrial, but ajury may impose a harsher sentence, defend-
ants are likely to be inhibited from exercising their constitutional right to ajury
determination on retrial. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 36-38 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 43-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[B]y establishing one rule for sentencing by
judges and another for sentencing by juries, the Court places an unnecessary bur-
den on the defendant's right to choose to be tried by a jury after a successful
appeal."). Justice Stewart, in dissent, also challenged the majority's premise that
vindictiveness was necessarily eliminated if the jury remained uninformed about
the defendant's earlier conviction and successful appeal. Id. (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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Crampton v. Ohio,251 furnishes another example, this one impli-
cating a defendant's right to present evidence to ajury on the ques-
tion of punishment. In Crampton, the defendant had been
convicted of murder and sentenced to death after a trial in which
the jury determined guilt and punishment in a single verdict after a
single proceeding.2 52 Crampton argued that the Constitution re-
quired a bifurcated proceeding. Under Ohio's unitary proceeding,
in order to testify on the question of punishment, he would have
had to subject himself to examination on the question of guilt.25 3
Thus, the cost of asserting the right to be heard on punishment was
the waiver of his right against self-incrimination; conversely, the
cost of asserting the right against self-incrimination by refusing to
testify was the inability to be heard on the question of punishment.
Rejecting Crampton's claim, the Court found nothing in the
privilege against self-incrimination that would allow a defendant to
limit the evidence he or she chooses to present.254 That the de-
fendant was put to a difficult choice did not in itself implicate con-
stitutional values. The choice whether to testify is often replete with
consequences. There is no constitutional impediment, for exam-
ple, to subjecting a criminal defendant to cross-examination should
he or she elect to testify, examination that could be avoided by the
choice to remain silent. Relying on Spencer v. Texas, the Court
noted other consequences attendant on the election to testify,
among which, of course, was impeachment by prior conviction. 255
Yet, the Court also suggested, through a "but cf" citation to Luck v.
United States,256 that there may be limits to the use of prior convic-
tion evidence to impeach.257 Moreover, as we have seen, Spencer fur-
nishes less than compelling support for the proposition that
criminal defendants may be routinely impeached by evidence of
prior convictions. 258
Interestingly, one branch of Crampton's argument was not
concerned with preventing him from testifying. Instead, it was con-
cerned with compelling him to do so in order to reach the jury on
251. 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (consolidated with McGautha v. California).
252. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 210-11.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 213-14.
255. Id. at 209-10.
256. For a discussion of the Court's holding in Luck, see supra notes 103-09
and accompanying text.
257. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 215.
258. For a discussion of the Court's holding in Spencer, see supra notes 159-69
and accompanying text.
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the question of punishment. The extent to which the defendant
was prohibited from presenting evidence to the jury on the ques-
tion of punishment was problematic. His counsel could argue for
leniency without implicating the defendant's right to remain silent.
Evidence relevant to punishment could also be presented. The
only "right," therefore, the defendant sought to vindicate was the
right to be heard in his own voice limited to the question of punish-
ment, a right the Court refused to recognize.
B. Burdening the Right to Testify
The right to testify, like other rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution, is not without limits. The lessons of the plea bargaining
cases, as well as the other cases discussed above, make it plain that
not all costs assessed for the assertion of a defendant's rights are
constitutionally impermissible. 25 9 If the practice that results in the
assessment of the cost is otherwise legitimate-plea bargaining or
jury sentencing, for example-the incidental cost to the assertion
of the defendant's right may be tolerable. Presumably, such a stan-
dard involves the balancing of the state's interest in the practice
against the cost to the right in question.
Thus, whatever may be the limits of the right to testify, there
must be some valid governmental purpose served by requiring a
defendant to bear a substantial cost for asserting that right. Per-
haps the most obvious purpose would be that the cost to the de-
fendant is necessary to serve the purpose of ascertaining truth.
More specifically, a defendant's right to testify may be limited by
the need to prevent false testimony.
For example, in United States v. Dunnigan,2 60 the defendant was
tried for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. She was the only witness
in her own behalf, denying the testimony of the Government's wit-
nesses and testifying that she had never possessed or dealt cocaine.
Government rebuttal witnesses testified that they had purchased co-
caine from the defendant. The defendant was convicted, and her
sentence was enhanced pursuant to the federal sentencing guide-
lines, based on the trial court's finding that she had committed per-
jury during the trial.261 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that enhancing a defendant's
259. For a discussion of plea bargaining cases, see supra note 247.
260. 507 U.S. 87 (1993).
261. Id. at 96. Her perjurious testimony "'willfully impeded or obstructed, or
attempted to impede or obstruct the administration ofjustice during the investiga-
tion or prosecution of the instant offense."' Id. at 92 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (1989)).
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sentence because of her perjurious trial testimony was unconstitu-
tional because it would inhibit defendants from testifying in their
own behalf, especially when combined with other disincentives to
testify-including the risk of impeachment by prior convictions. 262
The Supreme Court reversed.2 63 The Court noted the defend-
ant's right to testify in her own behalf, but went on to declare: "Re-
spondent cannot contend that increasing her sentence because of
her perjury interferes with her right to testify, for we have held on a
number of occasions that a defendant's right to testify does not in-
clude a right to commit perjury. ' 264 That point-that the right to
testify may be cabined by the search for truth-is perhaps most
strongly made in the Supreme Court's opinion in Nix v. Whiteside,265
upon which the Court relied in Dunnigan.
Although decided before Rock announced a constitutional
right to testify, Nix is undoubtedly still good law, as Dunnigan makes
clear.266 Nix involved the Sixth Amendment right to effective assist-
ance of counsel. Nonetheless, it sheds light on the scope of the
defendant's right to testify in his or her own behalf. In Nix, the
defendant, charged with murder, pleaded self-defense.2 67 He had
consistently told his counsel that he believed the victim was reach-
ing for a gun when he stabbed the victim, though he had not actu-
ally seen the gun.2 68 As the trial drew near, however, in preparation
for his direct examination, the defendant changed his story, telling
counsel for the first time that he had seen "something metallic" in
the victim's hand.269 When pressed by counsel, the defendant said,
"If I don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead."270
Counsel concluded that the gun was a product of the defend-
ant's mendacity and advised the defendant that he would not per-
mit him to testify perjuriously.2 71 Counsel threatened to advise the
court if Whiteside testified falsely, to impeach the testimony and to
withdraw from the representation.2 72 Whiteside testified that he be-
lieved the victim had a gun, but on cross-examination admitted that
262. United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 183-84 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
507 U.S. 87 (1993).
263. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 98.
264. Id. at 96.
265. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
266. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96-97.
267. Nix, 475 U.S. at 160-61.
268. Id. at 160.
269. Id. at 161.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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he had seen no weapon.273 Whiteside was convicted, and the con-
viction was affirmed by the state courts.274 He sought habeas
corpus relief in federal district court, claiming that his right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel had been violated by his lawyer's re-
fusal to permit him to testify as he wished.2 75 The district court
denied the writ, but the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed. 276
Treating as a factual finding that Whiteside's proposed testi-
mony would have been perjurious, the Supreme Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit's holding.2 77 The Court began its analysis with the
assumption that a criminal defendant has a right to testify in his or
her own behalf2 7 Nonetheless, that right does not include the
right to commit perjury.2 79 Much of the remainder of the opinion
considered the question whether Whiteside's lawyer had the right
or duty to behave as he did or whether that conduct denied White-
side the right to effective assistance, as the court of appeals had
held. The Court determined that the conduct of Whiteside's lawyer
fell within accepted norms of professional conduct and thus did not
deprive Whiteside of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.2 80
Moreover, Whiteside suffered no constitutionally cognizable
injury from his lawyer's conduct because it "at most, deprived
Whiteside of his contemplated perjury. '281 The Court added that
"[w] hatever the scope of a constitutional right to testify, it is ele-
mentary that such a right does not extend to testifying falsely."28 2
At the heart of the Court's opinion was the notion "that there is no
right whatever-constitutional or otherwise-for a defendant to
use false evidence."2 83 Thus, one might expect that evidence from
which a jury might infer the defendant was testifying falsely should
be admissible to impeach the defendant's testimony.
The Court's reliance on Haris v. New York284 and United States
v. Havens28 5 might be seen as lending additional support to such a
273. Id. at 161-62.
274. Id. at 162.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 163.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 164.
279. Id. at 173.
280. Id. at 174.
281. Id. at 172.
282. Id. at 173.
283. Id.
284. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
285. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
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proposition. In Harris, the defendant had been convicted of selling
narcotics. After his arrest, the defendant had made certain state-
ments to the police without having been advised of his right to ap-
pointed counsel during questioning, in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona.286 The prosecution did not seek to introduce these state-
ments during its case-in-chief, but when the defendant testified in-
consistently with these uncounseled out-of-court statements, the
defendant was cross-examined about whether he had made the
statements. 28 7 The jury was instructed that the out-of-court state-
ments attributed to the defendant could not be used as evidence of
guilt, but might be considered as prior inconsistent statements on
the question of the defendant's credibility as a witness.288
The Supreme Court, over a strong dissent, affirmed the de-
fendant's conviction. As in Nix, the Court's concern was with the
prevention of perjurious testimony. Noting, in dicta, the accused's
privilege to testify or remain silent, the Court declared: "IT]hat
privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit per-
jury."289 Hence, though the defendant's out-of-court statements
might have been obtained in violation of Miranda, they were admis-
sible to impeach the defendant by prior inconsistent statement.
Plainly, had the defendant not testified these statements would
have been inadmissible. Again, one might conclude that the admis-
sion of these statements, conditioned on the defendant testifying,
made the assertion of the right costly, and therefore that the
Court's approval of such use implies that there is no constitutional
impediment to the introduction of inculpatory evidence if the de-
fendant chooses to testify. As in Nix, however, the Court's concern
was whether the particular testimony offered by the accused was
perjurious. It is worth noting that these cases involved the specific
content of the defendant's testimony, rather than some more gen-
eral basis for questioning the defendant's credibility. This inculpa-
tory evidence was not admitted against the defendant merely
because he elected to testify. Rather, it was what the defendant said
when he did testify that was critical to the admissibility of the im-
peaching evidence.
In Oregon v. Hass,2 90 the Court considered a variation of the
situation in Harris. Hass had made inculpatory statements after hav-
286. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
287. Harris, 401 U.S. at 223.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 225.
290. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
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ing been given his Miranda warnings and requesting a lawyer.
Thus, the defendant's statements were inadmissible on the question
of his guilt. Nevertheless, the trial court permitted a police officer
to testify to the defendant's statements during the State's rebuttal
case, and instructed the jury that it might consider the officer's "tes-
timony only as it bears on the [credibility] of the Defendant as a
witness when he testified on the witness stand."291
The Oregon appellate courts held the statements inadmissible,
and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court concluded that Harris
controlled. As in Harris, "'the shield provided by Miranda cannot
be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free
from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utter-
ances."' 292 Like Harris, the Court in Hass was not concerned with
whether anything the defendant said was worthy of belief-it was
not the defendant's general credibility to which the disputed evi-
dence was directed. Rather, the Court was concerned with whether
particular testimony offered by the defendant was true or perjuri-
ous, and the inferences that ajury might draw from the defendant's
otherwise inadmissible prior inconsistent statements bore directly
on that question. 293
Jenkins v. Anderson294 was similar to Harris, except that the evi-
dence introduced to impeach the defendant was not a prior incon-
sistent statement taken in violation of Miranda, but the defendant's
pre-arrest silence claimed by the prosecution to be inconsistent
with his claim of self-defense. 295 Two weeks after Jenkins stabbed
Redding to death, he surrendered himself to the police. He
claimed that his actions were taken in self-defense and so testified
at his trial for murder. The prosecution was permitted to use his
pre-arrest silence and his failure to come forward for two weeks to
impeach his testimony that he had acted in self-defense. Interest-
ingly, the Supreme Court understood that Jenkins's silence might
not have been an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to re-
main silent, but considered that distinction irrelevant.2 96 The
Court declared that the applicable rule permitted impeachment by
silence whether or not the silence was constitutionally protected. 297
291. Id. at 717.
292. Id. at 721-22 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 226).
293. Id. at 722.
294. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
295. Id. at 235.
296. Id. at 236 n.2.
297. Id. at 238-39. The Court distinguished Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976),
which held that a defendant's silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda
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The Court considered and rejected the argument that permit-
ting the use of a defendant's silence to impeach his testimony
might make it less likely that a defendant would choose to remain
silent.2 98 In essence, the argument was that the evidentiary use of a
defendant's silence would burden the choice to remain silent.
Whatever burden the rule might impose on the Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent was not sufficiently substantial to warrant con-
stitutional protection.2 99 It is noteworthy that the constitutional
right at issue in Jenkins was the right to remain silent and not the
right to testify in one's own behalf. Indeed, that right had not yet
been recognized by the Court.300
Nevertheless, much of the Court's reasoning might be thought
to apply to the question whether particular forms of impeachment
impermissibly burden the defendant's right to testify in his or her
own behalf. The choice to testify or remain silent may have any
number of consequences that influence a defendant's decision. As
the Court noted, "It is not thought overly harsh in such situations to
require that the determination whether to waive the privilege [and
take the stand] take into account matters which may be brought out
on cross-examination."30 1
The question of which matters might be brought out on cross-
examination, however, is not an easy one.3 0 2 Under Jenkins, Harris
and similar cases, matters that bear directly on the defendant's testi-
mony are fair game for impeachment purposes.303 The Court in
Jenkins noted: "It is also generally recognized that a defendant who
warnings was not admissible to impeach his credibility. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239. In
Doyle, according to the Court, governmental action induced the petitioner to re-
main silent. Id. at 240 (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619). In Jenkins, by contrast, the
defendant's silence had nothing to do with any governmental action. Id. Conse-
quently, it was not a denial of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment to impeach the defendant with his pre-arrest silence. Id. at
238-40; see also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 420 (1957) (finding de-
fendant's silence before grand jury inadmissible to impeach exculpatory trial testi-
mony because probative value on issue of credibility was so negligible as to be far
outweighed by its possible impermissible impact on jury).
298. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236.
299. Id. at 238.
300. For a discussion of Rock v. Arkansas, in which the Court recognized a
consitutional right to testify in one's own behalf, see supra notes 208-20 and accom-
panying text.
301. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.3.
302. See generally James L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary
Rules: Policies, Principles, and Politics, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1301 (1992) (analyzing doc-
trines and policies courts employ to set boundaries for impeachment exception to
exclusionary rule).
303. Id. at 1349 & n.218.
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takes the stand in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of
prior convictions. 3 0 4 That issue, however, plainly was not before
the Court. Moreover, the right to testify had not yet been recog-
nized. Finally, the Court, like most other courts that have noted the
point, relied upon Spencer v. Texas for support.30 5 As we have seen,
however, the issue in Spencer did not address the question of im-
peachment by prior conviction. Spencer was concerned with the use
of prior convictions to enhance a defendant's sentence. 306 Thus,
all we can be reasonably certain of is that impeaching evidence that
addresses the content of a defendant's testimony may be admissible
without impermissibly burdening the defendant's right to testify in
his or her own behalf.
Walder v. United States,307 on which the Court in Harris relied,
makes the same point. In Walder, the Government had illegally ob-
tained physical evidence of defendant's involvement with narcotics
in a case unrelated to the one in which the defendant was being
tried.308 The evidence or testimony about the physical evidence,
inadmissible in the Government's case-in-chief, was held admissible
to impeach the defendant's testimony that he had never possessed
narcotics. Had the defendant not testified in his own behalf, testi-
mony about the illegally obtained evidence of his earlier possession
of narcotics would have been inadmissible. But, more precisely,
even if the defendant had chosen to testify in his own behalf, the
testimony about this illegally obtained evidence would have re-
mained inadmissible unless the content of the defendant's testi-
mony had triggered its use.
Like Walder, United States v. Havens 0 9 involved physical evi-
dence unlawfully obtained. Havens, like Harris, was one of the bases
of the decision in Nix, and like both of those cases, the Court's con-
cern was with the prevention of particular perjurious testimony by
the accused. Havens, however, went beyond Harris and Walder in
permitting the use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach testi-
mony the defendant had given on cross rather than on direct
examination.
Havens and McLeroth traveled from Peru to Miami, Florida.
At the Miami Airport, McLeroth was searched by customs officials
304. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.3.
305. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
306. For an analysis of the Court's holding in Spencer, see supra notes 159-69
and accompanying text.
307. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
308. Id. at 64.
309. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
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and was found to be carrying cocaine sewn into a makeshift pocket
on a tee shirt McLeroth was wearing under his shirt. McLeroth im-
plicated Havens, who was arrested. A warrantless search of
Havens's luggage revealed a tee shirt from which pieces had been
cut matching the pieces used to construct the makeshift pocket in
McLeroth's tee shirt.3 10 At a pre-trial hearing the tee shirt found in
Havens's luggage was suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search
and seizure.311
At trial, Havens testified in his own behalf, denying that he had
"taped or draped" material around McLeroth's body. On cross-ex-
amination, the Government inquired about Havens's involvement
with the makeshift pocket on McLeroth's tee shirt, and when the
defendant denied sewing the patches on the tee shirt, the Govern-
ment was permitted to inquire, over objection, about the tee shirts
that had been obtained as a result of the unlawful search of
Havens's luggage. In its rebuttal case, the Government was permit-
ted to introduce the fruits of the search as an exhibit.312
Havens's conviction was reversed by the court of appeals,
which held that "illegally seized evidence may be used for impeach-
ment only if the evidence contradicts a particular statement made
by a defendant in the course of his direct examination. 3 13 The
Supreme Court reversed. 314 Although the Government is not enti-
tled to introduce illegally obtained evidence after having "smuggled
in" the impeaching opportunity by raising an issue for the first time
on cross-examination, the situation is different where the cross-ex-
amination that provides the impeaching opportunity is on matters
fairly raised by the defendant's direct examination. 315 Presumably,
had the cross-examination gone beyond the scope of the direct, the
illegally obtained impeaching evidence would not have been admis-
sible. Thus, although Havens goes beyond Harris and Hass in al-
lowing the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence to
impeach a defendant's assertedly false testimony on cross-examina-
tion as well as on direct, the Court's focus remains on "the defend-
ant's obligation to speak the truth in response to proper
questions."316 Critical to the decision in Havens was the impeach-
ment of particular statements offered by the defendant, as witness,
310. Id. at 621-22.
311. Id. at 622.
312. Id. at 623.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 629.
315. Id. at 628.
316. Id. at 626.
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that the impeachment was aimed at attacking; the evidence was not
designed or offered to impeach the defendant's credibility more
generally, but to impeach the testimony. The Court's concern ap-
pears substantially the same as in Nix, Hass and Harris: the preven-
tion of perjurious testimony.3 17
How far that concern extends is not entirely clear. In Jones v.
United States,318 the Supreme Court had developed a rule of auto-
matic standing on the part of criminal defendants to challenge the
legality of searches the fruits of which were to be used against them
at trial. UnderJones, it was not necessary for the defendant to claim
a possessory interest in the fruits of the search. 319 The rationale for
the Jones ruling was that requiring the defendant to claim an inter-
est in the fruits of the search would be incriminating on the merits
if the motion to suppress the evidence were denied.
In United States v. Salvucci,3 20 the Court overruled Jones, elimi-
nating the automatic standing of criminal defendants to challenge
the illegality of searches the fruits of which were to be used against
them.3 21 Under Salvucci, defendants are required to establish that
it was their own Fourth Amendment rights that were violated by the
search. 32 2 Salvucci was based, at least in part, on the elimination of
the danger that a defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing
might be used to inculpate him or her at trial, for in Simmons v.
United States,323 the Court had held that a defendant's testimony in
support of a motion to suppress was inadmissible as evidence of the
defendant's guilt at trial.
The defendants in Salvucci, however, argued that the automatic
standing rule remained necessary because such testimony might be
used to impeach a defendant's trial testimony. The Court was quite
careful to leave to another day the question whether a defendant's
testimony at a suppression hearing might be used to impeach his or
her testimony at trial. 324 At the same time, the Court made it abun-
dandy clear that when that day came, it would find such testimony,
inadmissible on the question of the defendant's guilt, admissible to
317. See Kainen, supra note 302, at 1349-51 (criticizing anti-perjury rationale
behind Court's use of impeachment exception).
318. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980).
319. Id. at 266-67.
320. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
321. Id. at 84-85.
322. Id. at 85.
323. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
324. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 94.
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impeach the defendant should he or she choose to testify. The
Court declared: "A number of courts... have held that such testi-
mony is admissible as evidence of impeachment. '" 325 The Court fur-
ther noted that it "ha[d] held that 'the protective shield of Simmons
is not to be converted into a license for false representations.' ' 326
Thus, once .again the Court has expressed its concern that the
prevention of perjurious testimony by a criminal defendant is of
greater value than any prejudicial effect or inhibition on the right
to testify caused by the admission of the defendant's inculpatory
inconsistent statements used for impeachment purposes. But, once
again, it should be noted that the nature of the impeachment is
directed at specific testimony offered by the defendant and not at
the character of the defendant/witness.
C. Modes of Impeachment: A Proposed Standard
Even apart from clearly perjurious testimony, a defendant who
elects to testify subjects himself or herself to impeachment of that
testimony. And there are occasions when evidence that would not
be admissible absent the defendant's election to testify becomes ad-
missible to impeach. But not all evidence offered to impeach is of
equal moment, and not all such evidence is problematic. For exam-
ple, evidence that merely seeks to neutralize the defendant's testi-
mony by showing that it is unworthy of belief does not affirmatively
penalize the defendant. Thus, impeachment directed at mis-
perception, poor memory or failure to communicate does not pres-
ent the problems of prejudice that arise when a jury is asked to
conclude that the defendant/witness is lying. When, however, im-
peachment is directed at the defendant/witness's sincerity, the de-
fendant may be said to have been affirmatively penalized for
asserting the right to testify; the defendant pays a price-the admis-
sion of adverse evidence that may be used on the question of
guilt-that the defendant would not have had to pay had he or she
remained silent. Nevertheless, as the foregoing cases demonstrate,
where the search for truth-the jury's ability to evaluate the defend-
ant's specific testimony-warrants the admissibility of such evi-
dence, there is no constitutional infirmity in requiring the
defendant to bear this cost. Difficult choices are not necessarily
constitutional violations. A defendant's prior convictions generally
are thought of as belonging to this category of evidence, though, as
we have seen, prior convictions are different in important respects
325. Id. at 93 n.8.
326. Id. at 94 n.9 (quoting United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 243 (1974)).
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from the other kinds of evidence recognized as belonging to this
category.
In the case of impeachment by prior conviction, the ostensible
governmental purpose, presumably, is that the evidence of prior
convictions would assist the jury in assessing the credibility of the
defendant/witness's testimony, and hence to reach a more accurate
verdict. In the absence of that justification, the revelation of prior
convictions would seem to serve no purpose that would justify the
burden it imposes on the defendant's right to testify in his or her
own behalf. And, as we have seen, the bases for that justification
are, at best, problematic. 327
One suggested standard for determining when to admit evi-
dence offered to impeach the criminal defendant who elects to tes-
tify that is inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief is "whether
that evidence will tend, as its primary effect, to prove guilt. If it so
tends, it should be excluded as an impermissible burden on the
right to testify."328 Such a test focuses on the prejudice side of the
probativity versus prejudice balance. A more appropriate consider-
ation might be that suggested by the plurality in Loper v. Beto:3 29
Impeachment evidence used "for the purpose of directly rebutting
a specific false statement made from the witness stand" stands on a
different footing from impeachment evidence "used, rather, simply
in an effort to convict [the defendant] by blackening his character
and thus damaging his general credibility in the eyes of the jury."33 0
The Loper approach focuses more on the probativity side of the
probativity versus prejudice balance. Specifically, it addresses the
probative value of the evidence on the question of the credibility of
the defendant/witness's testimony. Everything else being equal,
the more focused the impeaching evidence on the specific testi-
mony offered, the more probative the impeaching evidence is likely
to be on whether the primary evidence is worthy of belief.
Perhaps one way of conceptualizing this standard is to hold
that the test for the admissibility of impeachment evidence on the
question of the defendant's sincerity should be whether the evi-
dence would be admissible in a plenary trial of the defendant for
perjury. Thus, evidence inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-
chief might be admitted if the defendant elects to exercise his or
327. For a discussion of the justifications given for admitting evidence of
prior convictions, see supra notes 87-158 and accompanying text.
328. Craig M. Bradley, Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci and the Defendant's
"Right" to Testify, 18 AMER. CuM. L. REv. 419, 430 (1981).
329. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
330. Id. at 482 n.11 (citations omitted).
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her right to testify and the evidence is offered as specific impeach-
ment. Yet, such evidence would not be admitted if offered merely
as general impeachment that carries with it some stigma that a jury
is likely to consider on the question of guilt. The difference be-
tween the former and the latter is that specific impeachment at-
tempts to demonstrate that some particular thing to which the
defendant testified is untrue, while general impeachment attempts
to demonstrate that the defendant/witness is simply unworthy of
belief, regardless of the particular content of the testimony.
There are two reasons that such a distinction makes sense.
First, when a defendant testifies to some specific fact and there is
conflicting evidence that the prosecution wishes to introduce, it
may fairly be said that the defendant has opened the door to the
impeaching evidence. The defendant should not be entitled to cre-
ate a false picture of reality before the jury. This is perhaps more
clearly illustrated in the analogous situation of character evidence.
The Government may not introduce evidence of the defendant's
bad character in its case-in-chief to show that the defendant is more
likely to have committed the charged offense. 331 Yet, if the defend-
ant introduces evidence tending to show his good character as evi-
dence that he or she is less likely to have committed the charged
offense, the prosecution is entitled to rebut with its evidence of bad
character.332 In this instance, the defendant is said to have opened
the door.
So, where a defendant testifies to the existence of some partic-
ular fact, the prosecution is entitled to inquire (at least) about state-
ments the defendant had made on other occasions inconsistent
with his or her statements on the stand, though these earlier state-
ments may not have been admissible in the absence of the defend-
ant's testimony.333 Similarly, with respect to impeachment by prior
331. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
332. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
333. See, e.g., Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1980) (finding no
violation of defendant's due process rights where prosecutor questioned defend-
ant about his failure to tell officers same story he was telling jury); California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (holding that Confrontation Clause is not violated
by admission of declarant's out-of-court statements if defendant is testifying and is
subject to cross-examination); United States v. Higa, 55 F.3d 448, 451-52 (9th Cir.
1995) (finding offered testimony admissible against defendant because testimony
related to something defendant had said in past); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d
490, 495-96 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that requirements for use of prior inconsistent
statements were met when defendant's prior statements were inconsistent with his
denial of recollection at trial); United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 622 (5th Cir.
1976) (holding testimony of prosecution witness admissible because it directly con-
tradicted defendant's testimony and was evidence of prior inconsistent statement).
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conviction, were the defendant to testify that he or she had never
been convicted of an offense, the Government should be entitled to
rebut with evidence of prior convictions.3 3 4
So, too, if the defendant were to testify to some particular fact
and a prior conviction cast doubt on the truth of the particular tes-
timony, the prior conviction would be admissible. For example, in
United States v. Lopez,3 3 5 the defendant had been convicted of mari-
juana offenses. The trial court permitted the Government to im-
peach Lopez's testimony with the record of a seventeen year-old
conviction for possession of marijuana. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the conviction was appropri-
ate impeachment evidence despite the ten year limit in Federal
Rule of Evidence 609 and the prohibition of extrinsic evidence of
prior specific instances of conduct of Federal Rule of Evidence
608.336 Indeed, the court found both rules inapplicable because
possession of marijuana does not go to the witness's character for
veracity. The record of conviction was admissible to impeach on a
different theory entirely: The defendant had testified that he had
never seen marijuana personally, and the prior conviction for pos-
session contradicted that testimony.3 37 Hence, the impeachment
was governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The court relied on
United States v. Opager,338 which held Rule 608 inapplicable to im-
peachment by contradiction,3 39 and United States v. Johnson,
3 4 0
which held Rule 609 inapplicable to impeachment by
contradiction. 3 4 1
United States v. Norton3 42 makes a similar point. Norton was
convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Before Norton de-
cided whether to testify, the trial court reviewed a number of prior
convictions and ruled that the Government could inquire about
only two of them if Norton elected to testify. While on the stand
Norton testified that he had never had a gun in his hand "in all my
334. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 542 F.2d 230, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1976)
(holding evidence of prior conviction admissible to contradict defendant's testi-
mony even though conviction was over ten years old).
335. 979 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1992).
336. Id. at 1033-34 ("Federal Rule of Evidence 403 controls the admission of
contradiction evidence, and the remote conviction, if admissible, was admissible
under Rule 403 in preference to Rules 608 and 609.").
337. Id. at 1034.
338. 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979).
339. Id. at 802.
340. 542 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1976).
341. Id. at 234-35.
342. 26 F.3d 240 (1st Cir. 1994).
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life."343 Over a defense objection, the Government was permitted
to ask Norton about a 1963 conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm-a conviction not admissible under the trial court's earlier
ruling. On appeal, the court held the inquiry appropriate impeach-
ment by contradiction. The inquiry into the prior conviction was
not designed to impeach the defendant's character for veracity, but
"to contradict material false testimony injected into the trial by Nor-
ton himself. '344 Again, the defendant may be said to have "opened
the door."
Second, and perhaps more important, specific impeachment-
evidence directed at showing that testimony of some particular fact
is unworthy of belief-advances the truth-finding purpose of the
trial to a greater extent than evidence tending to show that a wit-
ness's character for veracity renders him or her less worthy of belief.
We might think of the various impeachment devices as falling along
a continuum from the most specific to the most general. 345 Im-
peachment by contradiction-where the impeaching party in-
troduces evidence that directly contradicts some material fact to
which the defendant has testified-is the most specific form of im-
peachment.346 It is directed at a particular and important point in
the defendant's direct testimony. It points to the defendant's char-
acter only incidentally, in the sense that one who would lie about a
particular fact is more likely to be a bad person than one who is
always truthful. Its primary purpose, however, is to cast doubt not
on the defendant's character for veracity (or anything else), but on
the truth of the particular fact.3 47 Such evidence would plainly be
admissible in a trial of the defendant for perjury committed during
his testimony.
Impeachment by prior inconsistent statement falls a bit further
along the continuum.348 The prior inconsistent statement has dual
purposes. First, it casts doubt on the particular testimony with
343. Id. at 243.
344. Id. at 244; see also Gee v. Pride, 992 F.2d 159, 161-62 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding defendant's prior conviction for possession of PCP admissible after de-
fendant's testimony that he had never used PCP).
345. See Uviller, supra note 5, at 781-93 (suggesting somewhat different
classification).
346. Cf United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing that rule barring extrinsic evidence of misconduct to impeach is inapplicable
to evidence contradicting witness's testimony as to material fact).
347. For a discussion concerning impeachment by contradiction, see supra
notes 333, 346 and accompanying text.
348. See FED. R. EVID. 613 (setting out rules for examination of witness as to
prior statement and for use of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement).
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which it is inconsistent. Second, it provides the basis for an infer-
ence that the defendant is unworthy of belief more generally. Har-
ris, Hass and Jenkins are illustrative.3 49 Prior inconsistent statements
also would be admissible in a prosecution of the defendant alleging
perjury during the course of his or her testimony.
Impeachment by bias, interest or prejudice falls roughly mid-
way on the continuum. It tends to show that the witness's testimony
generally is unworthy of belief, but not necessarily because the wit-
ness is a bad person. Rather, while this category of impeachment is
not statement-specific, it is trial-specific. Thus, the context of dis-
trust is wider than impeachment directed at a particular statement,
but considerably narrower than impeachment offered to show that
nothing said by the defendant/witness is worthy of belief. It is note-
worthy that a defendant who elects to testify is always subject to im-
peachment by his or her interest in the outcome, whether or not
the Government undertakes cross-examination in this vein. The
jury is obviously aware of the defendant's interest and will surely
take that into account in assessing the credibility of the defendant
qua witness. Indeed, no other witness is likely to have the same mo-
tive to testify favorably as the defendant in a criminal case. If the
defendant were to be tried for perjury committed during his or her
testimony, evidence of bias, interest or prejudice would be admissi-
ble to show the defendant's motive to testify falsely.
It is when we come to impeachment directed at the character
of the witness that the cross-examiner's aim is at its widest.350 Im-
peachment by evidence that the witness's character for veracity is
poor suggests that the witness, not merely the witness's testimony, is
unworthy of belief. It is an impeachment device divorced from any
particular context, divorced from the particular testimony offered
by the witness, divorced even from the context of the particular
trial. It suggests that the witness is unworthy of belief regardless of
the circumstances. As other generalities, it is inherently less proba-
tive than more specifically aimed impeachment. Evidence of the
defendant's character for mendacity plainly would be inadmissible
as evidence that he or she committed perjury on a particular occa-
349. For a discussion of the Court's holdings in Harris, Hass and Jenkins, see
supra notes 284-301 and accompanying text.
350. In a sophisticated analysis of character impeachment, Professor Fried-
man also suggests elimination of this mode of impeachment of the criminal de-
fendant. Friedman, supra note 4, at 678-80. Friedman also suggests that such
reform might be coupled with a re-evaluation of the rule of Griffin v. California,
barring comment on a defendant's failure to testify. Id.
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sion.351 And evidence of prior specific acts involving dishonesty or
false statement even more plainly would be inadmissible to show
the defendant's character for mendacity.352
But impeachment by prior conviction presents even greater
problems on this probativity-prejudice continuum, and, conse-
quently, less justification for burdening the defendant's right to tes-
tify. As impeachment by evidence of the defendant/witness's poor
character for veracity, it is the most general form of impeachment,
tending to show that the defendant is unworthy of belief regardless
of context. Beyond that, however, it requires that the factfinder
draw an inference from prior conduct to the defendant's character,
an inference our jurisprudence generally forbids.
V. CONCLUSION
The defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to
testify in his or her own behalf. For defendants with a record of
prior convictions, the right to testify may amount to little more than
a paper guarantee, for if the defendant chooses to exercise the
right to testify the jury may learn about those prior convictions. It is
only by "waiving" the right to testify that the defendant may keep
such prejudicial information from the jury.
Of course, choosing to testify subjects the defendant to any
number of consequences he or she might rather avoid. After all, as
any other witness, the defendant is subject to impeachment of his
or her testimony, and evidence that might otherwise be inadmissi-
ble on the merits may become admissible if offered to impeach.
Much of this evidence presents no serious difficulty. If the im-
peaching evidence is directed at the witness's lack of memory or
ability to perceive, it does the testifying defendant no affirmative
harm. Such evidence serves primarily to neutralize the testimony.
Where the evidence is offered as an attack on the witness's
sincerity, however, the possibility of prejudice makes admissibility
problematic. Even then, where the evidence is directed at demon-
strating that some particular assertion of the defendant/witness is
false, the evidence should be admissible as a long series of Supreme
Court cases makes clear.353 The governmental interest in prevent-
ing perjurious testimony is sufficiently weighty to warrant the risk to
351. FED. R EVID. 404.
352. FED. R. EvID. 405.
353. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases regarding the admissibility of
evidence aimed at impeaching by contradiction or by prior inconsistent statement,
see supra notes 260-326 and accompanying text.
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the testifying defendant. Thus, impeachment by contradiction and
impeachment by prior inconsistent statement should remain per-
missible impeachment devices even when used against a testifying
defendant. In both instances, the evidence is directed at the testi-
mony offered by the defendant rather than at the defendant
personally.
Because it is the risk of perjurious testimony that provides the
governmental interest in impeaching the sincerity of the testifying
defendant, the most appropriate test for the admissibility of such
evidence is whether the evidence would be admissible in a subse-
quent trial of the defendant for perjury. Thus, evidence contra-
dicting the defendant's testimony would be admissible, as would
evidence that the defendant had made prior inconsistent state-
ments. Similarly, evidence of a defendant's motive for offering false
testimony, including the defendant's interest in the outcome,
would be admissible to impeach.
But where evidence ostensibly offered to impeach has a greater
impact on the assessment of the defendant's character than on the
question of the truthfulness of the defendant's testimony, the bur-
den on the defendant's constitutional right to testify can become
intolerable. That is precisely the case when a defendant is sought
to be impeached by evidence of prior convictions. Just as evidence
of character for mendacity would be inadmissible in a subsequent
trial for perjury, it should be inadmissible as impeachment evidence
if the defendant elects to testify.
Little of value would be lost by such a limitation. Prior convic-
tion evidence is not especially probative of the witness's credibility.
The probative value of such evidence rests on a number of infer-
ences: (1) that the conviction, often the result of a plea bargain
rather than a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, demon-
strates that the witness committed the offense; (2) that the commis-
sion of the particular offense demonstrates a continuing trait of
character for mendacity (though some predicate offenses may be
quite attenuated from speaking falsely); and (3) that a general
character trait of mendacity is acontextual-manifesting itself re-
gardless of the particular context in which the subject may find
himself or herself. Moreover, whatever probative value prior con-
viction evidence may have on the believability of a defendant's testi-
mony, it is likely to pale in the face of the defendant's obvious
interest in the outcome of the case, an interest that will cause the
jury to be cautious in its assessment of the defendant's testimony.
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Most important, permitting impeachment by prior conviction
is likely to deprive the jury of whatever evidence a defendant might
offer on the question of guilt or innocence by compelling the de-
fendant to "waive" the constitutional right to testify on pain of suf-
fering the prejudice of having the jury learn of his or her criminal
past.
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